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Abstract—In recent years, blockchain technology has received unpar-
alleled attention from academia, industry, and governments all around
the world. It is considered a technological breakthrough anticipated to
disrupt several application domains touching all spheres of our lives.
The sky-rocket anticipation of its potential has caused a wide-scale
exploration of its usage in different application domains. This has resul-
ted in a plethora of blockchain systems for various purposes. However,
many of these blockchain systems suffer from serious shortcomings
related to their performance and security, which need to be addressed
before any wide-scale adoption can be achieved. A crucial component
of any blockchain system is its underlying consensus algorithm, which
in many ways, determines its performance and security. Therefore, to
address the limitations of different blockchain systems, several existing
as well novel consensus algorithms have been introduced. A systematic
analysis of these algorithms will help to understand how and why any
particular blockchain performs the way it functions. However, the existing
studies of consensus algorithms are not comprehensive. Those studies
have incomplete discussions on the properties of the algorithms and
fail to analyse several major blockchain consensus algorithms in terms
of their scopes. This article fills this gap by analysing a wide range of
consensus algorithms using a comprehensive taxonomy of properties
and by examining the implications of different issues still prevalent in
consensus algorithms in detail. The result of the analysis is presented in
tabular formats, which provides a visual illustration of these algorithms
in a meaningful way. We have also analysed more than hundred top
crypto-currencies belonging to different categories of consensus al-
gorithms to understand their properties and to implicate different trends
in these crypto-currencies. Finally, we have presented a decision tree
of algorithms to be used as a tool to test the suitability of consensus
algorithms under different criteria.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Distributed Consensus, Proof of Work, PoW,
Proof of Stake, PoS, Delegated Proof of Stake, DPoS.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, blockchain has received wide-spread
attention among the industry, the Government, and aca-
demia alike. This interest has been piqued by the success
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of Bitcoin [1] that was introduced in 2008. While crypto-
currencies have emerged as the principal and the most pop-
ular application of blockchain technology, many enthusiasts
from different disciplines have identified and proposed a
plethora of applications of blockchain in a multitude of
application domains [2], [3]. The possibility of exploiting
blockchain in so many areas has created huge anticipation
surrounding blockchain systems. Indeed, it is regarded as
one of the fundamental technologies to revolutionise the
landscapes of the identified application domains.
A blockchain system is, fundamentally, a distributed
system that relies on a consensus algorithm that ensures
agreement on the states of certain data among distributed
nodes. A consensus algorithm is the core component that
directly dictates how such a system behaves and the per-
formance it can achieve. Distributed consensus has been
a widely studied research topic in distributed systems,
however, with the advent of blockchain, it has received
renewed attention. A wide variety of crypto-currencies
targeting different application domains has introduced an
array of unique requirements that can only be satisfied by
their corresponding consensus mechanisms. This fact has
fuelled the need not only to examine the applicability of
existing consensus algorithms in newer settings, but also to
innovate novel consensus algorithms. Consequently, several
consensus algorithms have emerged, each of which pos-
sesses interesting properties and unique capabilities.
As the characteristics of various types of blockchain
systems are fundamentally dependent on the consensus
algorithms they use, a systematic analysis of existing con-
sensus algorithms is required. It is necessary to examine,
compare, and contrast these algorithms. There have a been
a number of attempts aiming to fulfil this goal can be found
in [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. In particular, the works carried
out by Cachin et al. [4] and Bano et al. [5] are noteworthy as
they represent the pioneer works in this scope. Cachin et al.,
in their work, have explored different aspects of distributed
systems and consensus and focused on consensus algorithm
deployed in blockchain systems that are not to open to
the public. On the other hand, the focus of the work by
Bano et al. is more general in the sense they have explored
consensus algorithms used both in public as well as private
systems. Another exceptional work is by Wang et al. [6] in
which the authors have presented a comprehensive survey
of different aspects of consensus, mining, and blockchains
in a detailed fashion.
However, all these works have some major shortcom-
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2ings. For example, the factors upon which the consensus
algorithms have been analysed are not comprehensive.
Importantly, a wide range of consensus algorithms and
their internal mechanisms utilised in many existing crypto-
currencies have not been considered at all. In addition, all
of these studies have failed to capture the practical interrela-
tion between blockchain systems (mostly crypto-currencies)
and their corresponding consensus algorithms. All in all,
there is a pressing need for a study that analyses a wide
range of existing consensus algorithms and the blockchain
systems in a practical-oriented way and synthesises this
analyses into a conceptual framework in a concise yet com-
prehensive manner. The principal motivation of this article
is to fill in this gap.
Contributions. The main contributions of the article are
presented below:
• A novel taxonomy of consensus properties, capturing
different aspects of a consensus algorithm, has been cre-
ated. In this taxonomy, consensus algorithms have been
categorised in two major categories: incentivised and
non-incentivised algorithms, which have been again
sub-divided as per different considerations. Consensus
algorithms belonging to each sub-category analysed
together using the taxonomy of consensus properties.
• The analysis of each sub-category has been summarised
in tabular formats so as to visually represent it in a
comprehensible way.
• For each category (and the sub-category, if any), the cor-
responding blockchain systems (predominantly crypto-
currencies) have been analysed as well. The ana-
lysis result has been presented in a concise fashion,
which can be used to understand the inter-relation
between these systems and their underlying consensus
algorithms.
• The major issues in each category of consensus al-
gorithm have been examined in detail, and their im-
plications have been further analysed.
• Over hundred crypto-currencies, belonging to different
consensus algorithms, have been examined to under-
stand their different properties. These properties then
have been utilised to analyse and identify different
trends among these crypto-currencies.
• Finally, a decision tree of consensus algorithms have
been presented. This tree can be utilised to test the suit-
ability of a consensus algorithm under certain criteria.
In short, with these contributions, this article represents one
of the most comprehensive studies of blockchain consensus
algorithms as of now.
Structure. In Section 2 we present a brief background on dis-
tributed consensus, highlighting its different components,
types and properties. Section 3 outlines a brief presentation
on blockchain covering its different aspects such as types,
properties, layers. A taxonomy of consensus algorithms and
their underlying properties is presented in Section 4. Section
5 and Section 6 analyse different incentivised consensus
algorithm whereas Section 7 examines the different non-
incentivised consensus algorithms. Finally, we conclude in
Section 8 with a detailed discussion on different issues
involving the analysed consensus algorithms and the cor-
responding crypto-currencies.
2 BACKGROUND: DISTRIBUTED CONSENSUS
Consensus mechanisms in distributed systems have been
a well studied research problem for nearly three decades.
Such mechanisms enable consensus to be achieved regard-
ing a shared state/data among a set of distributed nodes.
The need for a shared state originated the notion of replic-
ated database systems in order to ensure resilience against
node failures within a network. Such database systems
ensure that data is not lost when one or more nodes fail
to function in an excepted fashion.
The notion of the replicated database can be generalised
with the concept of State Machine Replication (SMR) [11].
The core idea behind SMR is that a computing machine can
be expressed as a deterministic state machine. The machine
accepts an input message, performs its predefined computa-
tion, and might produce an output/response. These actions
essentially change its state. SMR conceptualises that such a
state machine, with an initial state, can be replicated among
different nodes. If it can be ensured that all the participating
nodes receive the same set of input messages in the exact
same order (the phenomenon known as atomic broadcast),
then each node would be able to evolve the states of its
state machine individually in exactly the same fashion. This
can guarantee consistency and availability regarding the
state of the machine (as well as data it holds) among all
(applicable) nodes even in the presence of node failures.
Once this occurs, it can be said that a distributed consensus
has emerged among the participating nodes. It is imperative
that a protocol is defined to ensure timely dissemination
and atomic broadcast of input messages among the nodes
and, in many ways, dictates how a distributed consensus is
achieved and maintained. Hence, such a protocol is aptly
called a consensus protocol.
Designing and deploying a consensus protocol is a chal-
lenging task as it needs to consider several crucial issues
such as resiliency against node failures, node behaviour,
network partitioning, network latency, corrupt or out-of-
order inputs, and so on [7]. Schneider pointed out that
there are two crucial requirements to reach and maintain
consensus among distributed nodes. The first requirement
is a deterministic state machine. The second requirement is
a consensus protocol to disseminate inputs in a timely fashion
and to ensure atomic broadcast among the participating
nodes. At the same time, the consensus protocols must
ensure the properties of the atomic broadcast [12], [13],
[4], [5]. The properties of atomic broadcast in distributed
consensus is illustrated in Table 1.
One way to achieve the design goals of such a protocol
is to make certain assumptions under which the protocol is
proved to function properly. These assumptions influence
the critical characteristics of a consensus protocol. Next,
we explore two sets of widely-used assumptions for any
distributed consensus protocol.
The first set of assumptions are about the underly-
ing networking type. Dwork et al. categorised three types
of networks exhibiting different properties: synchronous,
asynchronous, and partially/eventually synchronous [22].
The latency involved in delivering a message to all nodes
3Properties Note
Validity
This guarantees that if a message is broadcast by
a valid node, it will be correctly included within
the consensus protocol.
Agreement
This is to guarantee that if a message is de-
livered to a valid node, it will ultimately be
delivered to all valid nodes.
Integrity This is to ensure that a message is broadcastonly once by a valid node.
Total Order This is to ensure that all nodes agree to the orderof all delivered messages.
Table 1: Atomic broadcast Properties of Distributed Con-
sensus Protocols.
Properties Note
Safety/ Con-
sistency
A consensus protocol is considered safe (or con-
sistent) only when all nodes produce the same
valid output, according to the protocol rules, for
the same atomic broadcast.
Liveness/
availability
If all non-faulty participating nodes produce an
output (indicating the termination of the pro-
tocol), the protocol is considered live.
Fault
Tolerance
It exhibits the network’s capability to perform
as intended in the midst of node failures.
Table 2: Properties of Distributed Consensus Protocols.
in a synchronous network is bound by some time denoted
as ∆. On the other hand, the latency in an asynchronous
network cannot be reliably bound by any∆. Finally, in a par-
tially/eventually synchronous network, it is assumed that
the network will eventually act as a synchronous network,
even though it might be asynchronous over some arbitrary
period of time.
The second set of assumptions is about the different
properties of a consensus protocol. According to [7], a con-
sensus protocol should have the following three properties;
namely consistency, availability, and fault tolerance. These
properties are elaborated in Table 2 A well-known theorem,
by Fischer, Lynch and Paterson [23], called FLP Impossibility
has shown that a deterministic consensus protocol cannot
satisfy all three properties described above in an asynchron-
ous network. It is more common to tend to favour safety and
liveness over fault tolerance in the domain of distributed
system applications. A related theorem is the CAP theorem
[24], which states that a shared replicated datastore (or, more
generally, a replicated state machine) cannot achieve both
consistency and availability when a network partitions in
such a way that an arbitrary number of messages might be
dropped.
In addition to the above assumptions, there are two
major fault-tolerance models within distributed systems:
crash failure (or tolerance) and Byzantine failure [5], [7],
[4]. The crash failure model deals with nodes that simply
fail to respond due to some hardware or software failures.
It may happen any time without any prior warning, and
the corresponding node remains unresponsive until further
actions are taken. Byzantine failure, on the other hand, deals
with nodes that misbehave due to some software bugs or
because of the nodes being compromised by an adversary.
This type of failure was first identified and formalised by
Leslie Lamport in his seminal paper with a metaphorical
Byzantine General’s problems [14]. A Byzantine node can
behave maliciously by arbitrarily sending deceptive mes-
sages to others, which might affect the security of distrib-
uted systems. Hence, such nodes are mostly relevant in
application with security implications.
To handle these two failure models, two corresponding
major types of consensus mechanisms have emerged: Crash-
tolerant consensus and Byzantine consensus [4]. Next, we
briefly discuss each of them, along with their associated
properties.
1) Crash-tolerant consensus: Algorithms belonging to this
class aim to guarantee the atomic broadcast (total or-
der) of messages within the participating nodes in the
presence of certain number of node failures. These
algorithms utilise the notion of views or epochs, which
imply a certain duration of time or events. A leader
is selected for each epoch who takes decisions regard-
ing the atomic broadcast, and all other nodes comply
with its decision. In case a leader fails due to a crash
failure, the protocols elect a new leader to function.
The best known algorithms belonging to this class can
continue to function if the following condition holds:
t < n/2 where t is the number of faulty nodes and n
is the total number of participating nodes [4]. Examples
of some well-known crash-tolerant consensus protocol
are: Paxos [15], [16], Viewstamped Replication [17],
ZooKeeper [18], and Raft [19].
2) Byzantine consensus: This class of algorithms aim to
reach consensus amid of certain nodes exhibiting Byz-
antine behaviour. Such Byzantine nodes are assumed
to be under the control of an adversary and behave un-
predictably with malicious intent. Similar to any crash-
tolerant consensus protocol, these protocols also utilise
the concept of views/epochs where a leader is elected
in each view to order messages for atomic broadcast,
and other honest nodes are assumed to follow the in-
structions from the leader. One of the most well-known
algorithms under this class is called Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerant (PBFT), which can achieve consensus in
the presence of a certain number of Byzantine nodes
under an eventual synchronous network assumption
[20]. The tolerance level of PBFT is f < n/3, where
f the number of Byzantine nodes and n denotes the
number of total nodes participating in the network [4].
As we will explore later, PBFT algorithms have been
widely utilised in different blockchain systems.
3 BACKGROUND: BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we present a brief introduction to the block-
chain technology and it related terminologies. At the centre
of the blockchain technology is the blockchain itself stored
by the nodes of a P2P network. A blockchain is a type of
distributed ledger consisting of consecutive blocks chained
together following a strict set of rules. Here, each block is
created at a predefined interval, or after an event occurs, in
a decentralised fashion by means of a consensus algorithm.
Within each block, there are transactions by which a value is
transferred in case of crypto-currencies or a data is stored for
other blockchain systems. The consensus algorithm guar-
4antees several data integrity related properties (discussed
below) in blockchain.
Even though the terms blockchain and DLT (Distributed
Ledger Technology) are used inter-changeably in the literat-
ure, there is a subtle difference between them which is worth
highlighting. A blockchain is just an example of a particular
type of ledger, there are other types of ledger. When a ledger
(including a blockchain) is distributed across a network, it
can be regarded as a Distributed Ledger.
Since the blockchain technology has been introduced
with Bitcoin, it will be useful to understand how Bitcoin
works. In Section 3.1, we discuss a brief primer of Bitcoin
and its associated terminologies. Then, we describe differ-
ent properties and types of blockchains in Section 3.2 and
Section 3.3 respectively. Finally, we present the concept of
blockchain layers in Section 3.4.
3.1 Bitcoin
The Bitcoin network consists of nodes within a P2P (Peer-
to-Peer) network. Each node needs to download the Bitcoin
software to connect to the network. There are different types
of nodes in the network, with miner nodes and general
nodes being the major ones. A general node is mostly used
by users to transfer bitcoin in the network, whereas a miner
node is a special node used for mining bitcoins (see below).
Each user within a node needs to utilise wallet software
to create identities. An identity in the Bitcoin network con-
sists of a private/public key pair, and a bitcoin address is
derived from the corresponding public key. A sender needs
to know such an address of the receiver to transfer any
bitcoin. Bitcoin is transferred between two entities using the
notion of a transaction where the sender utilises a wallet
software for this purpose. This transaction is propagated to
the network, which is collected by all miner nodes. Each
miner node combines these transactions into a block and
then engages in solving a cryptographic puzzle, with other
miners, in which it tries to generate a random number which
satisfies the required condition (the random number must
be less than a target value called the difficult target). When
a miner successfully solves the puzzle, that miner is said
to have generated a valid block which is then propagated
in the network. The Bitcoin protocol generates a certain
amount of new Bitcoins for each new valid block and
rewards the miner for its effort in creating the block. Other
miners validate this newly mined block and then add it to
the blockchain. Each new block refers to the last block in the
chain, which in turn refers to its previous block, and so on.
The very first block in the chain, known as the genesis block,
however, has no such reference.
The decentralised nature of this mining process might
result in multiple valid blocks generated by different miners
and propagated at the same time in the network. All of them
are added to the blockchain and they refer to the same last
block in the chain. Consequently, multiple branches emerge
from the same blockchain. This is a natural phenomenon
in blockchain and is aptly known as fork. The fundamental
goal of the corresponding consensus protocol is to resolve
this fork so that only one branch remains and other branches
are discarded. The consensus algorithm utilised in Bitcoin
follows a simple rule: it lets the branches grow. As soon as
Figure 1: Block Generation Process of Bitcoin
A Each miner collects transactions that are broadcast
in the network and uses her hashpower to try to
generate a block via repeated invocation of a hash
function on data. The data consists of the transactions
that she saw fit to include, the hash of the previous
block, her public key address, and a nonce.
B When a miner succeeds in generating a block, mean-
ing that the hash of her block data is smaller than the
current difficulty target, she broadcasts her block to
the network.
C The other miners continue to extend the blockchain
from this new block, only if they find that this block
is valid, i.e., it refers the hash of the previous block
of the longest chain and meets the current difficulty
target.
D The block reward (newly minted coins) and the fees
from the transactions go to the miner’s public address.
This means that only the miner can spend those by
signing with her corresponding private key.
E The difficulty level readjusts according to the mining
power of the participates, by updating the hash target
value every 2016 blocks (≈2 weeks) so that blocks get
generated once every 10 minutes on average.
F The block reward starts at 50 coins and halves in every
210, 000 blocks, i.e., about every 4 years.
one branch grows longer than the others (more specifically,
the total cumulative computational effort of one branch ex-
ceeds the others), all miners select the longest branch (or the
branch with the highest computational effort), discarding all
other branches. Such a branch is known as the main branch
and other branches are known as orphan branches. Only
the miners in the main branch are entitled to receive their
Bitcoin rewards. When a fork is resolved across the network,
a distributed consensus emerges in the network.
The frequency of Bitcoin block generation depends on
the difficulty parameter, which is adjusted after 2016 blocks.
The protocol adjusts the difficulty parameter in such a way
that a block is generated in every 10 minutes on average.
However, the Bitcoin reward is halved after every 210, 000
blocks, or approximately after every 4 years. At the initial
stage, the reward for generating a valid block had been
50 Bitcoins, which was halved to 25 Bitcoins in 2012 and
12.5 Bitcoins in 2016. The next halving will occur in 2020
where the reward will be reduced to 6.25 bitcoins per block.
This geometric reduction in every four years underlines
a maximum total supply of 21 million of Bitcoins. It is
expected that this supply will be exhausted in the year of
2140 when the rewarded bitcoin will be infinitesimally small
for each block.
The process of Bitcoin protocol is presented in Figure 1.
3.2 Properties of blockchain
A blockchain exhibits several properties that make it a
suitable candidate for several application domains [25]. The
properties are discussed below.
5• Distributed consensus on the chain state: One of the
crucial properties of any blockchain is its capability to
achieve a distributed consensus on the state of the chain
without being reliant on any trusted third party. This
opens up the door of opportunities to build and utilise
a system where states and interactions are verifiable
by the miners in public blockchain systems or by the
authorised entities in private blockchain systems.
• Immutability and irreversibility of chain state:
Achieving a distributed consensus with the participa-
tion of a large number of nodes ensures that the chain
state becomes practically immutable and irreversible
after a certain period of time. This also applies to smart-
contracts and hence enabling the deployment and exe-
cution of immutable computer programs.
• Data (transaction) persistence: Data in a blockchain is
stored in a distributed fashion, ensuring data persist-
ence as long as there are participating nodes in the P2P
network.
• Data provenance: The data storage process in any
blockchain is facilitated by means of a mechanism
called the transaction. Every transaction needs to be
digitally signed using public key cryptography, which
ensures the authenticity of the source of data. Combin-
ing this with the immutability and irreversibility of a
blockchain provides a strong non-repudiation instru-
ment for any data in the blockchain.
• Distributed data control: A blockchain ensures that
data stored in the chain or retrieved from the chain can
be carried out in a distributed manner that exhibits no
single point of failure.
• Accountability and transparency: Since the state of
the chain, along with every single interactions among
participating entities, can be verified by any authorised
entity, a blockchain promotes accountability and trans-
parency.
3.3 Blockchain type
Depending on the application domains, different blockchain
deployment strategies can be pursued. Based on these
strategies, there are predominantly two types of block-
chains, namely Public and Private blockchain, as discussed
below:
• Public blockchain: A public blockchain, also known as
the Unpermissioned or permissionless Blockchain, allows
anyone to participate in the blockchain to create and
validate blocks as well as to modify the chain state by
storing and updating data through transactions among
participating entities. This means that the blockchain
state and its transactions, along with the data stored
is transparent and accessible to everyone. This raises
privacy concerns for particular scenarios where the
privacy of such data needs to be preserved.
• Private blockchain: A private blockchain, also known
as the Permissioned Blockchain, has a restrictive notion in
comparison to its public counterpart in the sense that
only authorised and trusted entities can participate in
the activities within the blockchain. By allowing only
authorised entities to participate in activities within the
blockchain, a private blockchain can ensure the privacy
of chain data, which might be desirable in some use-
cases.
3.4 Blockchain Layers
There are several components in a blockchain system whose
functionalities range from collecting transactions, propagat-
ing blocks, mining, achieving consensus and maintaining
the ledger for its underlying crypto-currencies, and so on.
These components can be grouped together according to
their functionalities using different layers similar to the
well-known TCP/IP layer. In fact, there have been a few
suggestions to design a blockchain system using a layered
approach [26], [27]. The motivation is that a layered design
will be much more modular and easier to maintain. For
example, in case a bug is found in a component of a layer
in a blockchain system, it will only affect the functionalities
of that corresponding layer while other layers remain unaf-
fected. For example, David et al. [27] suggest four layers:
consensus, mining, propagation, and semantic. However,
we believe that the proposed layers do not reflect the proper
grouping of functionalities. For example, consensus and
mining should be part of the same layer as mining can
be considered an inherent part of achieving consensus. In
addition to this, some blockchain systems might not have
any mining algorithms associated with it. In this paper,
we, therefore, will define four layers (Figure 2): network,
consensus, application, and meta-application. The function-
alities of these layers are briefly presented below.
Meta-Application Layer: The functionalities of the meta-
application layer in a blockchain system (see Figure 2) is to
provide an overlay on top of the application layer to exploit
the semantic interpretation of a blockchain system for other
purposes in other application domains. For example, Bitcoin
has been experimented to adopt in multiple application
domains, such as DNS like decentralised naming system
(Namecoin [28]), decentralised immutable time-stamped
hashed record (Proof of Existence [29]), and decentralised
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), such as Certcoin [30].
Application Layer: The application layer (in Figure 2)
defines the semantic interpretation of a blockchain system.
An example of a semantic interpretation would be to define
a crypto-currency and then set up protocols for how such
a currency can be exchanged between different entities.
Another example is to establish protocols to maintain a state
machine embodying programming capabilities within the
blockchain, which can be exploited to create and deploy
immutable code (the so-called smart contract). The applic-
ation also defines the rewarding mechanism, if any, in the
blockchain system.
Consensus Layer: The consensus layer, as presented in Fig-
ure 2, is responsible for providing the distributed consensus
mechanism in the blockchain that essentially governs the
order of the blocks. A critical component of this layer is the
proof protocol (e.g., proof of work and proof of stake) that is
used to verify every single block, which ultimately is used
to achieve the required consensus in the system.
Network Layer: The components in the network layer are
responsible for handling network functionalities which in-
clude joining in the underlying P2P network, remaining
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Figure 2: Blockchain Layers
in the network by following the underlying networking
protocol, disseminating the current state of the blockchain to
newly joined nodes, propagating and receiving transactions
and blocks and so on.
4 CONSENSUS TAXONOMY & PROPERTIES
With the introduction and advancement of different block-
chain systems, there has been a renewed interest in distrib-
uted consensus with the consequent innovation of different
types of consensus algorithms. These consensus algorithms
have different characteristics and functionalities. In this
section, we first distinguish between two major types of
consensus and then present a taxonomy of their properties.
Later, in Section 5 and 6, we explore numerous crypto
currencies and discuss incentivised consensus algorithms.
Similarly, we focus on non-incentivised consensus and the
blockchain applications in Section 7.
Consensus mechanisms used by the various blockchain
systems can be classified based on the reward mechanism
that participating nodes might receive. Therefore, we first
classify the consensus mechanisms in blockchain systems
into two categories: incentivised and non-incentivised al-
gorithms.
Incentivised Consensus. Some consensus algorithms re-
ward participating nodes for creating and adding a new
block in the blockchain. Such algorithms belong to this
category. These algorithms are exclusively used in public
Consensus 
properties
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properties
Block & reward 
properties
Security 
properties
Performance 
properties
Figure 3: Taxonomy of consensus properties.
blockchain systems and the reward provided acts as an
incentive for participating nodes to behave accordingly and
to follow the corresponding consensus protocol rigorously.
Non-incentivised Consensus. Private blockchain systems
deploy a type of consensus algorithms that do not rely
on any incentive mechanism for the participating nodes
to create and add a new block in the blockchain. Such
algorithms belong to this category. With the absence of any
reward mechanism, these nodes are considered trusted as
only authorised (allowed) nodes can participate in the block
creation process of the consensus algorithm.
4.1 Consensus properties
Each consensus algorithm has different characteristics and
serves different purposes. To compare these disparate
groups of consensus algorithms, we need to define eval-
uation criteria. In this section, we present this evaluation
criteria in the form of taxonomies of consensus proper-
ties. These properties have been collected from existing
researches, such as [5], [4], and compiled as a taxonomy in
this work.
The taxonomy is presented in Figure 3. According to this
taxonomy, a consensus mechanism has four major groups of
properties: Structural, Block & reward , Security and Perform-
ance properties. Each of these properties is briefly discussed
below.
4.1.1 Structural properties
Structural properties define how different nodes within a
blockchain network are structured to participate in a con-
sensus algorithm. These properties can be sub-divided into
different categories as illustrated in Figure 4. We briefly
describe each of these categories below.
• Node types: It refers to different types of nodes that
a consensus algorithm is required to engage with to
achieve its consensus. The types will depend on the
consensus algorithm which will be presented in the
subsequent section.
• Structure type: It refers to the ways different nodes are
structured within the consensus algorithm using the
concept of a committee. The committee itself can be
of two types: single and multiple committees. Each of
these committees is described below.
• Underlying mechanism: It refers to the specific mechan-
ism that a consensus algorithm deploys to select a particular
node. The mechanism can utilise lottery, the age of a
particular coin or a voting mechanism. A lottery can
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utilise either a cryptography based probabilistic mech-
anism or other randomised mechanisms. In a voting
mechanism, voting can be carried out either in a single
or multiple rounds. The coin-age, on the other hand,
utilises a special property, which depends on how long
a particular coin has been owned by its owner.
Next, we explore different types of voting committees for
existing consensus algorithms.
Single committee. A single committee refers to a spe-
cial group of nodes among the participating nodes which
actively participate in the consensus process by producing
blocks and extending the blockchain. Each single committee
can have different properties. Next, we briefly explore these
properties.
• Committee type: A committee can be open or close. A
committee is open if it is open to any participating nodes
or closed if it is restricted to a specific group of nodes.
• Committee formation: A committee can be formed
either implicitly or explicitly. An implicit formation
does not require the participating nodes to follow
any additional protocol rules to be in the committee,
whereas an explicit formation requires a node to follow
additional protocol steps to be a part of the committee.
• Committee configuration: A committee can be con-
figured in a static or a dynamic fashion.
– Static: In a static configuration, the members of the
committee are pre-selected and fixed. No new mem-
bers can join and participate in the consensus process.
– Dynamic: In a dynamic configuration, the committee
members are defined for a time-frame (known as
epoch), after which new members are added, and
old members are removed based on certain sets of
criteria. In such a committee, nodes are selected using
a voting mechanism where voting is carried either
in a single or multiple rounds. Some consensus al-
Block & Reward properties
Genesis date Block reward Total supply Block time
Figure 5: Taxonomy of block & reward properties.
gorithms, however, do not specify any specific time-
frame, and hence, members can join or leave any
time at will. Nodes in such configuration are selected
using a lottery mechanism which utilises either a
cryptography based probabilistic mechanism or other
randomised mechanisms.
Multiple committee. It has been observed that the time
it takes to achieve consensus in a single committee tends
to increase as the number of the member starts to increase
[5], thereby reducing performance. To alleviate this problem,
the concept of multiple committee has been introduced,
where each committee consists of different validators [5].
A multiple committee can have different properties. Next,
we explore two properties.
• Topology: It refers to the way different committees
are organised. For example, the topology can be flat
to indicate that different committees are at the same
level or can be hierarchical where the committees can be
considered in multiple layered levels.
• Committee configuration: In addition, like a single
committee, the multiple committees can be configured
in a static or dynamic way.
4.1.2 Block & reward properties
Properties under this category can be utilised as quantitat-
ive metrics to differentiate different crypto-currencies. The
properties are (Figure 5): genesis date, block reward, total
supply, formula, and block creation time. These proper-
ties do not necessarily characterise different consensus al-
gorithm directly, however, most of them (except the genesis
date) have a direct and indirect impact on how consensus is
achieved in a particular crypto-currency based blockchain
system. For example, block reward incentivises miners to
act accordingly by solving a cryptographic puzzle, which is
then ultimately used to achieve consensus. The properties
are described below:
• Genesis date represents the timestamp when the very
first block was created for a particular crypto-currency.
• Block reward represents the reward a node receives for
creating a new block.
• Total supply represents the total supply of a crypto-
currency.
• Block time represents the average block creation time
of a crypto-currency.
4.1.3 Security properties
A consensus algorithm must satisfy a number of security
properties as shown in (Figure 6) and are described below:
• Authentication: This implies if nodes participating in
a consensus protocol need to be properly verified/au-
thenticated.
8Security 
properties
Authentication
Non-
repuditation
Censorship 
reistance
Attack vectors
Adversary 
tolerance
Sybil protection
DoS
Nothing At 
Stake (NAS)
Bribing
Long-range
Accumulation
Grinding
Cartel
Figure 6: Taxonomy of security properties.
• Non-repudiation: This signifies if a consensus protocol
satisfies non-repudiation.
• Censorship resistance: This implies if the correspond-
ing algorithm can withstand against any censorship
resistance.
• Attack vectors: This property implies the attack vectors
applicable to a consensus mechanism. Here, we present
a set of attack vectors that are applicable to any con-
sensus algorithm. The other attack vectors presented in
Figure 6 are applicable to a specific class of consensus
algorithm. Therefore, we will discuss them in the up-
coming sections, when we explore such algorithms.
– Adversary tolerance: This signifies the maximum
byzantine nodes supported/tolerated by the respect-
ive protocol.
– Sybil protection: In a Sybil attack [34], an attacker
can duplicate his identity as required in order to
achieve illicit advantages. Within a blockchain sys-
tem, a sybil attack implicates the scenario when an
adversary can create/control as many nodes as re-
quired within the underlying P2P network to exert
influence on the distributed consensus algorithm and
to taint its outcome in her favour.
– DoS (Denial of Service) resistance: This implies if
the consensus protocol has any built-in mechanism
against DoS attacks.
4.1.4 Performance properties
The properties belonging to this group can be utilised
to measure the quantitative performance of a consensus
protocol. A brief description of each property is presented
below with its illustration in Figure 7
• Fault tolerance: signifies the maximum faulty nodes the
respective consensus protocol can tolerate.
Performance 
properties
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Figure 7: Taxonomy of performance properties.
• Throughput: implies the number of transactions the
protocol can process in one second.
• Scalability: refers to the ability to grow in size and
functionalities with- out degrading the performance of
the original system [31].
• Latency (Finality): refers to ”the time it takes from when a
transaction is proposed until consensus has been reached on
it” [5]. It is also known as finality.
• Energy consumption: indicates if the algorithm (or
the utilising system) consumes a significant amount of
energy.
5 INCENTIVISED CONSENSUS: POW & POS
In this section, we explore different incentivised consensus
algorithms. Such algorithms can be grouped in three major
categories: Proof of Work (PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS), and
Hybrid Consensus. Among them, this section discusses
PoW and PoS algorithms in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 re-
spectively. For readability, hybrid algorithms are presented
in Section 6.
5.1 Proof of Work (PoW)
A Proof of Work (PoW) mechanism involves two different
parties (nodes): prover (requestor) and verifier (provider).
The prover performs a resource-intensive computational
task intending to achieve a goal and presents it to a verifier
or a set of verifiers for validation that requires significantly
less resource. The core idea is that the asymmetry, in terms
of resource required, between the proof generation and
validation acts intrinsically as a deterrent measure against
any system abuse.
Within this aim, the idea of PoW was first presented
by Dwork and Naor in their seminal article in 1993 [33].
They put forward the idea of use PoW to combat email
spamming. According to their proposal, an email sender
would be required to solve a resource-intensive mathem-
atical puzzle and attach the solution within the email as a
proof that the task has been performed. The email receiver
would accept an email only if the solution can be success-
fully verified.
Within the blockchain setting, a similar concept has been
adopted. Each PoW mechanism is bound to a threshold,
known as the difficulty parameter in many blockchain sys-
tems. The prover would carry out the computational task in
several rounds until a PoW is generated that matches the
required threshold, and every single round is known as a
single proof attempt.
PoW has been the most widely-used mechanism to
achieve a distributed consensus among the participants
9regarding the block order and the chain state. In particu-
lar, a PoW mechanism in a blockchain serves two critical
purposes:
• A deterrent mechanism against the Sybil Attack. In
PoW, every mining node would require a significant
monetary investment to engage in a resource-intensive
PoW mechanism during the block creation process. To
launch a Sybil attack, the monetary investment of an
attacker will be proportional to the number of Sybil
identities, which might outweigh any advantage gained
from launching a Sybil attack.
• The PoW mechanism is used as an input to a function
which ultimately is used to achieve the required distrib-
uted consensus when a fork happens in a blockchain
[44].
We differentiate between three major classes of PoW
consensus mechanisms: Compute-bound PoW, Memory-bound
PoW and Chained PoW. Each of these is explored in the
following sections.
5.1.1 Compute-bound PoW
A Compute-bound PoW, also known as CPU-bound PoW,
employs a CPU-intensive function that carries out the re-
quired computational task by leveraging the capabilities of
the processing units (e.g., CPU/GPU), without relying on
the main memory of the system. These particular charac-
teristics facilitate the scenario in which the computation
can be massively optimised for faster calculation using
Application-specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) rigs. This has
drawn criticisms among the crypto-currency enthusiasts as
general people cannot participate in the mining process with
their general purpose computers, and the mining process is
mostly centralised among a group of mining nodes.
Hashcash by Back et al. [45] is the earliest example to
leverage a PoW mechanism in practical systems. Similar to
the proposal of Dwork and Naor in [33], Hashcash is also
designed to combat spams. In this scheme, the email sender
would require to generate a SHA-1 hash with a certain prop-
erty using as the input a number of information including
recipient’s email address and date. The property dictates
that the generated hash must have at least 20 bits of leading
zeroes. Generating an SHA-1 hash with this property would
require the senders to engage in several proof attempts in
a pseudo-random fashion. Once the hash is generated, it
is added within the email header. The verification on the
recipient’s side is rather trivial, which requires comparing a
newly generated hash using the required information with
the supplied hash. If they match, it proves that the email
sender has engaged in the required amount of computa-
tional work. The effectiveness of this approach of fighting
spams depends on the hypothesis that spammers rely on
the revenue model requiring a mere amount of cost to send
a single email. When they would need to engage in such
a computationally intensive task for sending every single
email, the aggregated associated cost might heavily affect
their profit margin and thus deter them from spamming.
Nakamoto consensus is the compute-bound PoW con-
sensus algorithm leveraged in Bitcoin. It is based on the
approach of Hashcash, modified to be applied within the
blockchain setting. As discussed in Section 3.1, all mining
nodes (miners) compete with each other to generate a valid
block by finding a solution smaller than the difficulty target.
Similar to the idea of HashCash, the miners need to engage
in several proof attempts, until the solution is found. In
each of these proof attempts, each miner generates a hash
using either the SHA-256 or SHA-256d (a double hashing
mechanism using SHA-256) algorithm and checks if the
generated hash is smaller than the difficulty target. The
effect of this distributed engagement is that forks happen,
and then the Nakamoto consensus algorithm is utilised to
resolve the fork and to achieve a network-wide distributed
consensus. The reader is referred back to Section 3.1 (and
Figure 1) for a brief description of Nakamoto consensus.
Currently, there are many crypto-currencies that utilise
the Nakamoto consensus algorithm. Table 3 shows the top
10 of such currencies according to their market capitalisation
as rated by CoinGecko 1 (a website which tracks different
activities related to crypto-currencies) as of July 24, 2019.
The table also presents their Block and reward properties
as presented in Figure 5. It is to be noted that information
regarding the properties in Table 3 for these (and other
subsequent) currencies has been collected by consulting
their corresponding whitepapers, websites and introductory
announcements on Reddit website 2.
5.1.2 Memory-bound PoW
To counteract the major criticism of compute-bound PoWs
allowing the utilisation of ASIC-based rigs for the mining
purpose (see Section 5.1.1), memory-bound PoWs have been
proposed. A memory-bound PoW requires the algorithm to
access the main memory several times and thus ultimately
binds the performance of the algorithm within the limit
of access latency and/or bandwidth as well as the size of
memory. This restricts ASIC rigs based on a memory-bound
PoW to have the manifold performance advantage over
their CPU/GPU based counterparts. In addition, the profit
margin of developing ASIC with memory and then building
mining rigs with them is not viable as of now for these
classes of PoWs. Because of these, memory-bound PoWs
are advocated as a superior replacement for compute-bound
PoWs in de-monopolising mining concentrations around
some central mining nodes.
There is a large variety of consensus algorithms be-
longing to this class, unlike the consensus algorithms of
compute-bound PoW which are largely based on Hashcash.
These algorithms can be further categorised as follows:
Cryptonight; Scrypt and its variants; Equihash; Ethhash/D-
agger; Neoscript; and Timetravel. We now describe each
of these different types of memory-bound PoW consensus
algorithm.
1) CRYPTONIGHT. Cryptonight is a class of PoW consensus
algorithms that, in principle, is a memory-hard hash func-
tion [32]. It utilises the Keccak hashing function [46] intern-
ally and relies on a 2MB scratchpad residing on the memory
of a computer. The scratchpad is extensively used to per-
form numerous read/write operations at pseudo-random
1. https://www.coingecko.com/
2. https://www.reddit.com/
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Table 3: Top ten crypto-currencies that utlise Nakamoto consensus algorithm.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Bitcoin/Bitcoin Cash
[69] [70]
03.01.2009 12.5 21 10m
Syscoin [71] 16.08.2014 80.04659537 888 1m
Peercoin [72] 19.08.2012 55.17265345 2000 10m
Counterparty [73] 01.02.2014 All currency in circulation 2.6m -
Emercoin [75] 11.12.2013 Smooth emission 41 10m
Namecoin [76] 19.04.2011 12.50000000 21 10m
Steem Dollars [77] 04.06.2016 Smooth emission Unlimited 3s
Crown [78] 08.09.2014 1.8 42 1m
XP 24.08.2016 2220 NA
Omni (Mastercoin) [79] 31.07.2013 16.71249999 Omni 0.6 20s
addresses within that scratchpad. In the final step, the
desired hash is generated by hashing the entire scratchpad.
Its reliance on a large scratchpad on the memory of a
system makes it resistant towards FPGA and ASIC mining
as the economic incentive to create FPGA, and ASIC mining
hardware might be too low for the time being. As such,
Cryptonight introduces the notion of so called Egalitarian
proof of work [32] or proof of equality, which enables anyone
to join in the mining process using any modern CPU and
GPU.
One prominent property of the coins belonging to this
class is that all of them support stronger sender-receiver
privacy by facilitating anonymous transactions.
Current currencies utilising Cryptonight according to
Coingeko as of July 24, 2019 is presented in Table 4. Like
Table 3, Table 4 also presents their Block and reward prop-
erties as presented in Figure 5.
2) SCRYPT AND ITS VARIANTS. Scrypt is a password based
key driving function (KDF) that is currently used in many
crypto-currencies [47]. A KDF is primarily used to gen-
erate one or more secret values from another secret key
and is widely used in password hashing. Previous key
deriving functions such as DES-based UNIX Crypt-function,
FreeBSD MD5 crypt, Public-Key Cryptography Standards#5
(PKCS#5), and PBKDF2 do not impose any specific hard-
ware requirements. This enables any attacker launch attacks
against those functions using specific FPGA or ASIC en-
abled hardware, the so-called custom hardware attacks [48].
Scrypt has been designed to counteract this threat.
Toward this aim, one of the core characteristics of Scrypt
is its reliance on the vast memory of a system, making it
difficult to perform using FPGA and ASIC enabled cus-
tom hardware. In the underneath, Scrypt utilises Salsa20/8
Core [49] as its internal hash function. A simplified version
of Scrypt is used in the corresponding crypto-currencies,
which is much faster and easier to implement, and can be
performed using any modern CPU and GPU. Hence, anyone
can join in the mining process for crypto-currencies using
this function. However, the ever-increasing price of crypto-
currencies has incentivised miners to produce custom ASIC
hardware for some crypto-currencies utilising Scrypt in
recent times. An example of such hardware that can be used
to mine different Scrypt crypto-currencies is Antminer L3+
[50].
To tackle this issue of exploiting ASIC for mining, sev-
eral Scrypt variants have been proposed: Scrypt-N/Scrypt
Jane/Scrypt Chacha and Scrypt-OG, each providing particu-
lar advantages over others. Scrypt-N and Scrypt Chacha rely
on SHA256 and ChaCha [52] as their internal hash functions,
respectively, whereas Scrypt Jane utilises a combination of
different hash functions. All of them support progressive
and tunable memory requirements, which can be adjusted
after a certain period. This is to ensure that custom ASIC
hardware is rendered obsolete once the memory require-
ment is changed. Finally, Scrypt-OG (Optimised for GPU)
is optimised to be eight times less memory intensive than
Scrypt [51].
Table 5 shows the top 10 currencies, which either use
Scrypt or one of its variants, as per their market capitalisa-
tion according to CoinGecko as of July 24, 2019.
3) EQUIHASH Equihash is one of the recent PoW algorithms
that has been well received in the blockchain community
[55]. It is a memory-bound PoW that requires to find a solu-
tion for the Generalised Birthday problem using Wagner’s
algorithm [56]. Equihash has been designed to decentralise
the mining procedure itself, similar to other memory-bound
approaches. However, so far, very small portions of such
algorithms have succeeded. One of the crucial reasons for
this is that their underlying time-memory complexity trade-
off is largely constant. This means that reducing memory
requirement in these algorithms have little effect on their
corresponding time complexity.
Wagner’s solution has a steep time-memory complexity
trade-off, reducing memory increases time complexity sub-
stantially. This premise has been exploited by Equihash to
ensure that mining is exclusively proportional to the amount
of memory a miner has. Thus, it is more suitable for a gen-
eral purpose computer, rather than any ASIC-enabled hard-
ware which can only have relatively small memory in order
to make their production profitable for the mining process.
Due to this reason, it has been claimed that Equihash can
support ASIC resistance, at least for the foreseeable future.
In addition, the verification is extremely lightweight and
even can be carried out in resource-constrained mobile
devices. Table 6 shows the eight currencies which utilise
Equihash according to CoinGecko as of July 24, 2019.
4) ETHASH (DAGGER-HASHIMOTO)/DAGGER. Ethash is a
memory-bound PoW algorithm introduced for Ethereum
with the goal to be ASIC-resistant for a long period of
time [58]. It was previously known as Dagger-Hashimoto
algorithm [59] because of its utilisation of two different
algorithms: Dagger [60] and Hashimoto [60].
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Table 4: Top ten crypto-currencies that utilise Cryptonight, with Bytecoin being the first to use this algorithm.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply (Million) Block Time
Monero 18.04.2014 4.86930501 Starting at M = 264 − 1
infinite supply
2.0m
Bytecoin 04.07.2012 666.76 184.46 billion 2.0m
Aeon 06.06.2014 5.48 Starting at M = 264 − 1,
infinite supply.
4.0m
Boolberry 17.05.2014 4.85 18.5 Million 2.0
Karbowanec 30.05.2016. 8.83 Starting with 10 Million, in-
finite supple
4.0m
Fantomcoin 06.05.2014 smooth emission, 50% coins will be
emitted in 6 years and block reward
decreases with a similar Starting at
M = 264 − 1
infinite supply 1.0m
Dashcoin fork of
Bytecoin
05.07.2014 1.55 2.0m
QuazarCoin 08.05.2014 smooth emission 2.0
BipCoin 20.08.2016 smooth emission 2.0
Cannabis Industry
Coin
16.10.2016 70.00000000 21 M 2.0
Table 5: Top ten crypto-currencies using Scrypt.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Litecoin [80] 13.10.2011 25.00 84 million 2.5m
Verge [82] 15.02.2016 730.00 16.5 billion 0.5m
Bitmark [83] 13.07.2014 (no longer monitored
after 2016)
27.58 million 2.0m
Dogecoin [84] 06.12.2013 10000.00 Total supply NA
GameCredits [85] 01.06.2015 fixed (12.5 coins) 84 million 1.5m
Einsteinium [86] 01.03.2014 2 2.9 billion 1.0m
Voxels [87] 03.11.2015 smooth emission 2.1 billion 2.5m
Viacoin [88] 18.07.2014 0.63 23 million 0.5m
Hempcoin [89] 9.03.2014 smooth emission 2.5 billion 1.0m
Table 6: Crypto-currencies utilising Equihash algorithm.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Zcash [90] 28.10.2016 10 21 million 2.5m
Bitcoin Gold [91] 24.10.2017 12.5 21 million 10m
Komodo [92] 15.10.2016 3 200 million 1m
Zclassic [93] 6.11.2016 12.5 21 million 2.5m
ZenCash [94] 30.05.2017 7.5 21 million 2.5m
Hush [95] Genesis date 11.25 21 million 2.5m
BitcoinZ [96] 10.09.2017 12500.00 21 billion 2.5m
VoteCoin [97] 31.08.2017 125 2.2 billion 2.5m
Dagger is one of the earliest proposed memory-bound
PoW algorithm which utilises Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG) for memory-hard puzzle solving with trivial verific-
ation that requires less memory to be used in resource con-
strained devices. However, the Dagger algorithm is proven
to be vulnerable towards a shared memory hardware ac-
celeration attack, as discussed in [61]. That is why it has
been dropped as a PoW candidate for Ethereum. Hashimoto
algorithm, on the other hand, relies on the delay incurred for
reading data from memory as the limiting factor and thus,
is known as an I-O bound algorithm.
Ethash combines these two algorithms to be ASIC-
resistant and functions as follows. Ethash depends on a
large pseudo-random dataset, which is recomputed during
each epoch. Each epoch is determined by the time it takes
to generate 30,000 blocks in approximately five days. This
dataset is essentially a directed acyclic graph and hence, is
called DAG. During the DAG generation process, a seed is
generated at first, which relies on the length of the chain.
The seed is then used to compute a 16 MB pseudo-random
cache. Then, each item of the DAG is generated by utilising
a certain number of items from the pseudo-random cache.
This entire process enables the DAG to grow linearly with
the growth of the chain. Then, the latest block header and
the current candidate nonce are hashed using Keccak (SHA-
3) hash function, and the resultant hash is mixed and hashed
several times with data from the DAG. The final hashed
digest is compared to the difficulty target and accepted or
discarded accordingly.
Every mix operation in Ethash requires to have a read in
a pseudo-random fashion from the DAG, which is randomly
accessed from the memory. This serves two purposes:
• The read operation is limited by the speed of the
memory access bandwidth, which is thought to be
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theoretically optimal, and thus, more optimisation is
less likely.
• Even though the mixing circuitry can be built within an
ASIC, the bottleneck would still be the memory access
delay.
That is why Ethash is thought to be suitable for use on
commodity computing capacity with good powerful GPUs.
To achieve the same level of performance, an ASIC would
require to accommodate as large memory as a general
purpose computer providing a financial disincentive.
There are currently two currencies utilising Ethereum
according to coingecko as of July 24, 2019 [62]. Even though
Dagger algorithm is proven not to be ASIC resistant, it is
being used in 6 currencies [63]. All of these are presented in
Table 7.
5) NEOSCRYPT. NeoScrypt, an extension of Scrypt, is a key
derivation function that aims to increase the security and
performance on CPUs and GPUs while being strong ASIC
resistant [146]. Internally it utilises a combination of Salsa
20/20 [49] and ChaCha 20/20 [52] along with Blake2s [74].
Its constructions impose larger memory segment size, and
hence, larger temporal buffer requirements. This makes it
1.25 times more memory intensive than Scrypt. The motiva-
tion is that this higher requirement of memory will act as a
deterrent towards building ASICs for NeoScrypt.
Currently, there are 10 currencies utilising NeoScrypt
according to Coingecko as of 18 July, 2019 [147] which are
presented in Table 8.
5.1.3 Chained PoW
A chained PoW utilises several hashing functions chained
together in a series of consecutive steps. Its main motiv-
ation is to ensure ASIC resistance, which is achieved by
the underlying mechanisms by which the corresponding
hashing functions are chained together. In addition to this,
the PoW algorithms belonging to this series aim to ad-
dress one particular weakness of any compute-bound and
memory-bound PoW algorithm: their reliance on a single
hashing function. With the advent of quantum computing,
the security of a respective hashing algorithm might be
adversely affected, which undermines the security of the
corresponding blockchain system. If this happens, the old
algorithm needs to be discarded, and a new quantum res-
istant hashing algorithm needs to be incorporated to the
respective blockchain using a mechanism called hard-fork.
A hard-fork is a mechanism by which a major update is
enforced in a blockchain system. This is quite a disruptive
procedure that has negative effect on any blockchain system.
In such scenarios, a chained PoW algorithm would continue
to function until all its hashing functions are broken.
There are several chained PoW algorithms that are cur-
rently available.
1) X11/X13/X15. X11 is a widely-used hashing algorithm in
many crypto-currencies. In X11, eleven hashing algorithms
are consecutively carried our one after another. The hash-
ing algorithms are blake, bmw, groestl, jh, keccak, skein, luffa,
cubehash, shavite, simd, and echo.
One advantage of X11 is that it is highly energy effi-
cient: GPUs computing X11 algorithm requires approxim-
ately 30% less wattage and remains 30 − 50% cooler in
comparison to Scrypt [54]. Even though the algorithm has
been designed in such a way that it can only be used with
CPUs and GPUs, the economic incentives have allowed the
creation of ASIC to be used during the mining process.
It has different variants where the number of chained
hashing functions differs. For example, X13 utilises 13 hash-
ing functions, and X15 utilises 15 hashing functions.
Table 9 presents the top 10 crypto-currencies utilising
these three algorithms, as per their market capitalisation as
of July 24, 2019 according to CoinGecko.
2) QUARK. Quark PoW algorithm relies on six different
hashing functions: BLAKE [74], Blue Midnight Wish [64],
Grøstl [65], [140], JH [66], Keccak and Skein [67]. These
functions are implemented in mixed series with nine steps
[138]. Within these nine steps, three functions are randomly
applied in three steps depending on the value of a bit. The
main motivations of mixing these six functions in nine steps
are as follows:
• To alleviate the risk of a compromised system in light of
its underlying single hashing algorithm being broken.
• To impose restrictions so that Quark can only be
mined using CPUs while making it difficult to mine
using GPUs and ASICs, because of the usage of ASIC-
resistant mechanisms (e.g. Keccak).
However, it did not take long before ASIC mining
hardware for Quark appeared in the market, so that this
could be mined using a GPU and ASIC [68]. However,
the profitability and performance of such hardware are not
obvious.
The currencies utilising Quark according to CoinGecko
as per July 24, 2019 [139] are presented in Table 10.
3) LYRA2RE. Lyra2RE is a class of chained PoW which util-
ises five hash functions: BLAKE, Keccak, Lyra2,[13] Skein,
and Grøstl. It has been developed by the developers of
Vertcoin, a currency based on Lyra2RE. It was designed
to be CPU friendly, however, it was discovered in 2015
that the majority of the hashing power utilised for mining
VertCoin in its network was facilitated by a botnet stealing
CPU cycles from a large number of infected computers. This
motivated the Vertcoin developers to release Lyra2REv2,
which utilises six hash functions, BLAKE, Keccak, Cube-
Hash, Lyra2, Skein, and Blue Midnight Wish with GPU
only PoW. Currently, there are only three currencies utilising
Lyra2REv2 according to CoinGecko as of 31 December 2017
which are presented in Table 11.
4) MAGNIFICENT 7. Magnificent 7 (M7) is a class of chained
PoW which utilises seven hash functions to generate the
candidate hash during the mining process of Cryptonite
coin (not to be confused with the Cryptonight PoW al-
gorithm) [143]. The utilised hash functions are SHA-256,
SHA-512, Keccak, RIPEMD, HAVAL, Tiger and Whirlpool.
Internally, the header of the candidate block sequentially
hashed by the corresponding functions and then multiplied
to generate the final hash, which is then compared against
the difficulty threshold. Even though it a not memory-
bound PoW, it has been claimed that the multiplication
operation enables it to run on a general purpose CPU easily,
however, makes it difficult to run on GPUs and ASICs
[143]. Even so, there are is at least one GPU miner available
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Table 7: Crypto-currencies utilising Ethash algorithm. The block rewards are in the corresponding currencies.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Ethereum [98] 30.07.2015 2 infinite supply 10-20s
Ethereum Clas-
sic [99]
30.07.2015 3.88 10-20s
Ubiq [100] 28.01.2017 6 NA 88s
Shift [101] 01.08.2015 1 infinite supply 27s
Expanse [102] 13.09.2015 4 31.4 Million 1.0m
DubaiCoin-
DBIX [103]
27.03.2017 6 Total supply 1.5m
SOILcoin [104] 03.10.2015 3.0 Total supply 52s
Krypton [105] 15.02.2016 0.25 2.67 Million 1m 44s
Table 8: Crypto-currencies utilising NeoScrypt and Timetravel 10 algorithms. The block rewards are in the corresponding
currencies.
Currency Algorithm Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Red Pulse [106] 17.10.2017 NA 1.36 Billion NA
Feathercoin [107] NeoScrypt 16.04.2013 40 336 Million 1.0m
GoByte [108] NeoScrypt 17.11.2017 3.71 31.8 Million 2.5m
UFO Coin [109] NeoScrypt 03.01.2014 625 4 Billion 1.5m
Innova [110] NeoScrypt 19.10.2017 2.64 1.29 Million 2m
Vivo [88] NeoScrypt 20.08.2017 4.5 1.1 Million 2m18s
Desire [113] NeoScrypt Genesis date 10.45 1.17 Million 2.5m
Orbitcoin [114] NeoScrypt 28.07.2013 0.5 3.77 Million 6.0m
Phoenixcoin [115] NeoScrypt 08.05.2013 12.5 98 Million 1.5m
Bitcore [116] Timetravel 10 April 24, 2017 3.13 21 Million 2.5m
Table 9: Crypto-currencies utilising X11/X13 algorithms. The block rewards are in the corresponding currencies.
Currency Algorithm Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Dash [117] X11 January 19, 2014 1.55 22 Million 2.5m
Stratis [118] X13 August 09, 2016 NA NA NA
Cloakcoin [119] X13 Genesis date 496.00 4.5 Million 1.0m
Stealthcoin [120] X13 July 04, 2014 NA 20.7 Million 1.0m
DeepOnion [121] X13 July 13, 2017 4 18.9 Million 4m
HTMLcoin [122] X15 September 12, 2014 NA 90 Billion 1.0m
Regalcoin [123] X11 September 28, 2017 NA 7.2 Million NA
Memetic [124] X11 March 05, 2016 NA NA NA
ExclusiveCoin [125] X11 June 12, 2016 NA NA NA
Creditbit [126] X11 November 02, 2015 NA 100 Million 1.0m
Table 10: Crypto-currencies utilising Quark algorithm. The block rewards are in corresponding currencies.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Quark [67] July 21, 2013 1 247 Million 0.5s
PIVX [128] NA 5 NA 1.0m
MonetaryUnit [129] July 26, 2014 18 1 Quadrillion 0.67m
ALQO [130] October 30, 2017 3 NA 1m
Bitcloud [131] August 15, 2017 22.5 200 Million 6.5m
Zurcoin [132] NA 12.5 NA 0.75m
AmsterdamCoin [133] November 01, 2015 10 84 Million 1.0m
Animecoin [134] NA NA NA NA
Table 11: Crypto-currencies utilising Lyra2RE algorithm. The block rewards are in corresponding currencies.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Vertcoin [135] January 10, 2014 25 84 Million 2.5m
Monacoin [136] January 01, 2014 25 105 Million 1.5m
Crypto [137] April 30, 2015 NA 65.8 Million 0.5m
for M7 [144]. Its performance, though, is not known. The
corresponding information for Cryptonite is presented in
Table 12.
5.1.4 PoW Limitations
PoW (Nakamoto) consensus algorithm has been widely
accoladed for its breakthrough in the distributed consensus
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Table 12: Information regarding Cryptonite utilising M7 algorithm.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply
(Million)
Block Time
Cryptonite July 28, 2014 Dynamic 1.84 Billion 1 Minute
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Figure 8: Bitcoin energy consumption over the last years.
paradigm, starting with Bitcoin. It had laid down the
foundation for the subsequent advancement, which resul-
ted in different PoW algorithms and crypto-currencies as
discussed in the earlier sections. Even so, there are some
significant limitations. Next, we briefly discuss these limita-
tions:
• Energy consumption: Each PoW algorithm needs to
consume electricity to compute the hash. As the dif-
ficulty of the network starts to increase, so does the
energy consumption. The amount of consumed energy
is quite significant when calculated over the whole net-
work consisting of ASIC/GPU mining rigs all around
the world. Digiconomist 3 website tracks the electricity
consumption of Bitcoin and Ethereum. According do
it, the energy consumption of Bitcoin and Ethereum
are around 40 TWh (Tera-Watt Hour) and 10 TWh,
respectively. Their energy consumption graphs for the
last one year are presented in Figure 8 [148] and Figure
9 [149].
Figure 9: Ethereum energy consumption over the last year.
3. https://digiconomist.net/
To put this into perspective, we present Figure 10,
whose data has been collected from [148]. This figure
illustrates Bitcoin’s energy consumption relative to the
electricity consumption of different countries. For ex-
ample, the electricity consumed by Bitcoin in a year
could power up 6, 770, 506 American households and
is much more than what Czech Republic consumes in
a year [148]. The utilisation of this huge amount of
electricity has raised the question of sustainability of
PoW-based crypto-currencies.
Figure 10: Bitcoin energy consumption relative to different
countries.
• Mining centralisation: With the ever-increasing diffi-
culty rate, miners within a PoW-based crypto-currency
network need to upgrade the capability of their AS-
IC/GPU mining rigs to increase their chance of cre-
ating a new block. Even so, it becomes increasingly
difficult for a single miner to join in the mining process
without substantial investment in the mining rigs. The
consequence is that the economies of scale phenomenon
strongly impacts the PoW algorithms. The economies
of scale in economic theory is the advantage a pro-
ducer can gain by increasing its output [150]. This
happens because the producer can spread the cost of
per-unit production over a larger number of goods,
which increases the profit margin. This analogy also
applies to PoW mining as explained next. A mining
pool can be created where the mining resources of
different miners are aggregated to increase the chance
of creating a new block. Once a mining pool receives
a reward for creating the next block, the reward is
then proportionally divided among the participating
miners. Unfortunately, this has led to the centralisation
problems where block creations are limited among a
handful of miners. For example, Figure 11 illustrates
the distribution of network hashrate among different
miners in Bitcoin [152]. As evident from the figure, only
five mining pools control the 75% of hashrate of the
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whole network. There is a fear that they could collude
with each other to launch the 51% attack to destabilise
the whole bitcoin network.
Known Blocks.
Relayed By count
BTC.com 74
Unknown 41
F2Pool 39
Poolin 38
AntPool 37
SlushPool 27
BTC.TOP 26
ViaBTC 16
An estimation of hashrate
distribution amongst the largest mining pools
The graph below shows the market share of the most popular bitcoin mining pools. It should only be used as a
rough estimate and for various reasons will not be 100% accurate. A large portion of Unknown blocks does not
mean an attack on the network, it simply means we have been unable to determine the origin.
24 hours - 48 hours - 4 Days
Bitcoin Hashrate Distribution - Blockchain.info https://www.blockchain.com/en/pools?timespan=48hours
1 of 1 27/07/2019, 10:08 pm
Figure 11: Bitcoin hashrate distribution of mining pools.
• Tragedy of commons: Many PoW algorithms suffer an
economic problem called the Tragedy of the commons. In
economic theory, the tragedy of the commons occurs
when each entity rushes to maximise its profit from a
depleting resource without considering the well-being
of all that share the same resource [151]. This situation
occurs in a crypto-currency if it is deflationary in nature
with limited supply, e.g. Bitcoin. It has been argued
when the reward of creating a new block in Bitcoin
will reach nearly zero; the miners will have to solely
rely on the transaction fees to cover their expenses.
This might create an unhealthy competition among the
miners to include as many transactions as possible, just
to maximise one’s profit. The consequence of this is
that transaction fees will keep decreasing, which might
lead to a situation that miners cannot make enough
profit to continue the mining process. Eventually, more
and more miners will leave the mining process, which
might lead toward 51% attacks or other scenarios that
de-stabilise the Bitcoin network.
• Absence of penalty: All PoW algorithms (both com-
pute and memory bound) are altruistic in nature in
the sense that they reward behaving miners, however,
do not penalise a misbehaving miner. One example is
that a miner can collude with a group of miners (a
phenomenon known as selfish mining) to increase its
profitability in an illegitimate way [153]. In addition,
a miner can engage in Denial-of-Service attack by just
not forwarding any transaction or block within the
network. Furthermore, such malicious miners can join
forces to engage in the spawn-camping attack, in which
they launch DoS attacks simultaneously over and over
again to render the network useless for the corres-
ponding crypto-currency [156]. A penalty mechanism
would disincentivize any miner to engage in any type
of malicious misbehave.
5.1.5 Analysis
In this section, we summarise the properties of different
PoW algorithms in Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15 utilising
the taxonomies presented in Section 4. In these tables, a
‘ ’ symbol is utilised to indicate if a particular property is
supported by the corresponding algorithm. For other prop-
erties, explanatory texts have been used for any particular
property.
As presented in Table 13, different types of PoW al-
gorithms share exactly similar characteristics. In these al-
gorithms, they are mainly two types of nodes: clients and
miners. Miners are responsible for creating a block using
a randomised lottery mechanism. Conversely, clients are
the nodes that are responsible for validating each block as
well as utilised to transact bitcoin between different users.
Committees in these algorithms represent the set of miners,
exhibiting the property of a single open committee structure
where anyone can join as a miner. The respective committee
is formed implicitly in a dynamic fashion, indicating any
miner can join or leave whenever they wish.
As per Table 14, none of the algorithms requires any
node to be authenticated to participate in the algorithm. All
of them have strong support for non-repudiation in the form
of digital signature as part of every single transaction. These
algorithms have a high level of censorship resistance, which
means that it will be difficult for any regulatory agency
to impose any censorship on these algorithms. As for the
attack vector, each PoW algorithm requires every miner
node to invest substantially for mining hardware in order
to participate in these consensus algorithms. This feature,
thus, acts as a deterrent against any Sybil or DoS attack in
any PoW algorithm. The adversary tolerance is based on the
assumption that PoW suffers from 51% attacks, and thus,
adversary nodes need to have less than 50% of the total
hashing power of the network.
According to Table 15, these algorithms have low
throughput, and unfortunately, do not scale properly. Fur-
thermore, most of the algorithms require a considerable time
to reach finality, and their energy consumption is consider-
ably high, as explained in Section 5.1.4. The fault tolerance in
these algorithms is 2f + 1 like any BFT algorithm, implying
they can achieve consensus as long as more than 50% of
nodes function correctly.
5.2 Proof of Stake
To counteract the limitations of any PoW algorithm, another
type of consensus algorithm, called Proof of Stake (PoS) has
been proposed. The earliest proposal of a PoS algorithm
can be found on the bitcointalk forum in 2011 [154]. Soon
after, several projects started experimenting with the idea.
Peercoin [72], released in 2012, was the first currency to
utilise the PoS consensus algorithm.
The core idea of PoS evolves around the concept that the
nodes who would like to participate in the block creation
process must prove that they own a certain number of coins
at first. Besides, they must lock a certain amount of its
currencies, called stake, into an escrow account in order to
participate in the block creation process. The stake acts as
a guarantee that it will behave as per the protocol rules.
The node escrows its stake in this manner is known as the
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Table 13: Structural properties of PoW consensus algorithms.
Single committeeNode type Type Formation Configuration Mechanism
Clients & Miners Open Implicit Dynamic Lottery, Randomised
Table 14: Security properties of PoW consensus algorithms.
Attack VectorsAuthentication Non-repudiation Censorshipresistance Adversary tolerance Sybil protection DoS Resistance
x High 2f + 1
Table 15: Performance properties of PoW consensus algorithms.
Fault tolerance Throughput Scalability Latency Energy consumption
2f + 1 Low Low Medium-High High
stakeholder, leader, forger, or minter in PoS terminology.
The minter can lose the stake, in case it misbehaves.
In essence, when a stakeholder escrows its stake, it
implicitly becomes a member of an exclusive group. Only a
member of this exclusive group can participate in the block
creation process. In case the stakeholder gets the chance to
create a new block, the stakeholder will be rewarded in one
of the two different ways. Either it can collect the transaction
fees within the block, or it is provided a certain amount of
currencies that act as a type of interest against their stake.
It has been argued that this incentive, coupled with any
punitive mechanism, can provide a similar level of security
of any PoW algorithm. Moreover, it can offer several other
advantages. Next, we explore a few benefits of a PoS mech-
anism [156].
• Energy Efficiency: A PoS algorithm does not require
any node to solve a resource-intensive hard crypto-
graphic puzzle. Consequently, such an algorithm is
extremely energy efficient compared to their PoW coun-
terpart. Therefore, a crypto-currency leveraging any
PoS algorithm is likely to be more sustainable in the
long run.
• Mitigation of Centralization: A PoS algorithm is less
impacted by the economies of scale phenomenon. Since
it does not require to build up a mining rig to solve
any resource-intensive cryptographic puzzle, there is
no way to maximise gain by increasing any output.
Therefore, it is less susceptible to the centralisation
problem created by the mining pool.
• Explicit Economic Security: A carefully designed pen-
alty scheme in a PoS algorithm can deter any misbe-
having attack, including spawn-camping. Anyone en-
gaging in such attacks will lose their stake and might
be banned from any block creation process in the fu-
ture, depending on the protocol. This eventually can
strengthen the security of the system.
Initial supply: One of the major barriers in a PoS
algorithm is how to generate the initial coins and fairly
distribute them among the stakeholders so that they can be
used as stakes. We term this barrier as the bootstrap problem.
There are two approaches to address the bootstrap problem:
• Pre-mining: A set of coins are pre-mined, which are
then sold before the launch of the system in an IPO
(Initial Public Offering) or ICO (Initial Coin Offering).
• PoW-PoS transition: The system starts with a PoW
system to fairly distribute the coins among the stake-
holders. Then, it slowly transitions towards the PoS
system.
Reward process: Another important aspect is the re-
warding process to incentivise the stakeholder to take part
in the minting process. Unlike any PoW, where a miner is
rewarded with new coins for creating a valid block, there is
no reward for creating a valid block. Instead, to incentivise
a minter, two types of reward mechanisms are available
within a PoS algorithm:
• Transaction Fee: The minter can collect fees from the
transactions included within the minted block.
• Interest rate: A lower interest rate is configured, which
allows the currency to inflate over time. This interest
is paid to the minter as a reward for creating a valid
block.
Selection process: A crucial factor in any PoS algorithm
is how to select the stakeholder who can mint the next block.
In a PoW algorithm, a miner is selected based on who can
find the resource-intensive desired hash. Since PoS does not
rely on hind such a hash as the mechanism to find the
next block, there must be a mechanism to select the next
stakeholder.
Currently, there three different approaches to Proof of
Stake: Chained, BFT, and Delegated.
CHAINED POS. The general idea of a chained PoS is to
deploy a combination of PoW and PoS algorithms chained
together to achieve any consensus. Because of this, there
can be two types of blocks, PoW and PoS blocks, within
the same blockchain system. To accomplish this, the cor-
responding algorithm relies on different approaches to se-
lect/assign a particular miner for creating a PoW block or
select a set of validators for creating a PoS block in different
epochs or after a certain number of blocks created. In
general, a chain based PoS can employ any of the following
three different approaches to select the miner/stakeholder:
• Randomised PoW Mining: A miner who can solve the
corresponding cryptographic PoW puzzle is selected in
a random fashion.
• Randomised Stakeholder Selection: A randomised PoS util-
ises a probabilistic formula that takes into account the
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staked currencies and other parameters to select the
next stakeholder. The other parameters ensure that a
stakeholder is not selected only based on the number of
their staked coins and act as a pseudo-random seed for
the probabilistic formula.
• Coin-age based selection. A coin-age is defined as the
holding period of a coin by its owner. For example, if
an owner receives a coin from a sender and holds it for
five days then the coin-age of the coin can be defined
as five coin-days. Formally,
coin − age = coin ∗ holdingperiod
Algorithms belonging to this class select the stake-
holder using staked coins of the stakeholders and their
corresponding coin-age.
In general, a chained PoS algorithm favours towards
availability over consistency when network partition occurs,
as per the CAP theorem.
BFT POS. BFT PoS is a multi-round PoS algorithm. In the
first step, a set of validators are pseudo-randomly selected to
propose a block. However, the consensus regarding commit-
ting this block to the chain depends on the > 2/3 quorum
of super-majority among the validators on several rounds. It
inherits the properties of any BFT consensus, and as such, it
tolerates up to 1/3 of byzantine behaviour among the nodes.
In general, a BFT PoS algorithm favours towards con-
sistency over availability when network partition occurs,
within the setting of CAP theorem.
DELEGATED PROOF OF STAKE. Delegated Proof of Stake
(or DPoS in short) is a form of consensus algorithm in which
reputation scores or other mechanisms are used to select the
set of validators [184]. Even though it has the name Proof of
Stake associated with it, it is quite different from other PoS
algorithms.
In DPoS, users of the network vote to select a group
of delegates (or witnesses) who are responsible for creating
blocks. Users utilise reputations scores or other mechanisms
to choose their delegates. Delegates are the only entities
who can propose new blocks. For each round, a leader is
selected from the set of delegates who can propose a block.
How such a leader is chosen depends on the respective
system. The leader gets rewards for creating a new block,
and is penalised and de-listed from the set of validators if it
misbehaves.
The delegates themselves compete with each other to get
included in the validator list. In such, each validator might
offer different levels of incentives for the voters who vote for
it. For example, if a delegate is selected to propose a block,
it might distribute a certain fraction of its reward among the
users who have selected it. Since the number of validators
is small, the consensus finality can be fast.
Next, we explore several crypto-currencies or mechan-
isms that use the above mentioned PoS approaches.
5.2.1 Chained PoS
Next, we present two examples of a chained PoS algorithm
to illustrate how this approach has been applied in practice.
1) PEERCOIN (PPCOIN). Peercoin is the first crypto-
currency to formalise the notion of PoS by utilising a hybrid
PoW-PoS protocol [174]. The Peercoin protocol is based on
the assumption that coin-age can be leveraged to create a
PoS algorithm which is as secure as any PoW algorithm
while minimising the disadvantages associated with a PoW
algorithm.
Peercoin protocol recognises two different kinds of
blocks: PoW blocks and PoS blocks, within the same block-
chain. These blocks are created by two separate entities:
miners and minters. Miners are responsible for creating
PoW blocks, similar to Bitcoin whereas minters are respons-
ible for creating PoS blocks. Irrespective of the last block
type, the next block either can be a PoW block or a PoS
block, and these entities compete with each other to create
the next block [175]. Miners compete with other miners to
find a valid PoW block that matches the PoW difficulty
target, similar to Bitcoin. Similarly, minters compete among
themselves to find a valid PoS block that matches the PoS
difficulty target (similar to a PoW algorithm but requires
much less computation). As soon as any PoW or PoS block
is found, it is broadcast to the network, and other nodes
validate it.
Within a PoS block, a minter utilise their holding coins
as a stake, and the minter is rewarded approximately 1%
per annum based on the coin-age of the staked coins. The
reward is paid out for each block in a newly created special
transaction called the coinstake transaction. Each coinstake
transaction consists of the number of staked inputs and a
kernel, containing the hash that meets the PoS difficulty.
The hash itself is calculated over a small space and hence
not computationally intensive at all. It utilises the number
of staked inputs and a probabilistic variable, whereas the
difficulty condition is calculated utilising the coin-age of
the staked inputs as well as a difficulty parameter. This
parameter is adjusted dynamically to ensure that one block
is created in 10 minutes. In other words, the valid kernel
depends on the coin-age of the staked inputs, and the higher
the coin-age, the higher is the probability to match the
difficulty.
The coinstake transaction is paid to the minter, which
contains the coins staked along with the reward. Once a
PoS block is added to the chain, the coin-age of the staked
coins is reset to zero. This indicates that all the stacked coins
are consumed. This ensures that the same coins cannot be
used over and over again to create a PoS block within a
short period of time. The main chain in Peercoin is selected
based on the highest total coin-age consumed in all blocks.
That means, if a PoW block and PoS block are received
simultaneously as the next block by a node, the algorithm
dictates the PoS block to be selected over the PoW block.
The block reward for a PoW block in Peercoin decreases
and will cease to be significant after a certain period of time.
It is currently used for the coin generation and distribution
purpose and will be completely phased out in the future
[205]. It has no role whatsoever on securing the network,
which is largely based on the PoS algorithm. Once the PoW
algorithm is phased out, it is suggested that the energy
consumption of Peercoin will be significantly low while
providing similar security as any PoW algorithm.
Peercoin is highly regarded for formalising the first
alternative mechanism to PoW, however, it suffers from all
the attack vectors of PoS, as presented in Section 5.2.4. Two
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other coins Black and Nxt removes age from the equation
in order to avoid the exploitation of the system by the
dishonest entities having a significant amount of coins.
2) CASPER FFG. Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget
(CFFG) is a PoW-PoS hybrid consensus algorithm proposed
to replace the Ethereum’s PoW consensus algorithm [181]. In
fact, CFFG provides an intermediate PoS overlay on top of
its current PoW algorithm so that Ethereum is transformed
to a pure PoS protocol called Casper the Friendly Ghost
(CTFG) described below (Section 5.2.2).
The PoS layer requires the participation of validators.
Any node can become a validator by depositing some Eth-
ereum’s native crypto-currency called Ether to a designated
smart-contract, which acts as a security bond. The network
itself will mostly consist of PoW miners who will mine
blocks according to its current PoW algorithm. However,
the finalisation/check-pointing of blocks will be carried out
by PoS validators. The check-pointing/finalisation is the
process to ensure that the chain becomes irreversible up
to a certain block and thus, short and low range attacks
(particular types of PoS only attacks presented in Section
5.2.4) as well as the 51% attack cannot be launched beyond
the check-pointing block.
The check-pointing occurs every 50 blocks, and this
interval of 50 blocks is called an epoch [158]. The finalisation
process requires two rounds of voting in two successive
epochs. The process is as follows. In an epoch, the validators
vote on a certain checkpoint c (a block). A super-majority
(denoted as +2/3) occurs when more than 2/3 of the valid-
ators vote for the checkpoint c. In such a case, the checkpoint
is regarded as justified. If in the next epoch, (+2/3) of the
validators vote on the next checkpoint c′ (a block which
is a child of the block belonging to C), c′ is considered
justified whereas c is considered finalised. A checkpoint
created in this manner for each epoch is assumed to create
a checkpoint tree where c′ is a direct child of c. The process
can be summarised in the following way: +2/3 Vote c →
Justify c→ +2/3 Vote c′ → Finalize c and Justify c′
Once a checkpoint is finalised, the validators are paid.
The payment is interest-based and is proportional to the
number of ethers deposited. If it occurs that there are two
checkpoints, it signifies that a fork has occurred. This can
only happen when a validator or a set of validators has de-
viated from the protocol. In such cases, a penalty mechanism
is imposed in which the deposit of the violating validator(s)
is destroyed.
In essence, CGGF is a combination of Chained and BFT
consensus mechanisms with strong support for availability
over consistency. Its properties ensure that block finalisation
occurs quickly, and the protocol is mostly secure against all
PoS attacks except the cartel formation attack (a particular
type for PoS only presented in Section 5.2.4). However, it is
to be noted that this consensus mechanism has not been
implemented yet. Therefore, it is yet to be seen how it
performs in reality.
5.2.2 BFT PoS
In this section we describe three notable BFT PoS algorithms
that have had significant uptake in practice: Tendermint,
CTFG and Ouroboros.
1) TENDERMINT. Tendermint is the first to showcase how
the BFT consensus can be achieved within the PoS setting
of blockchain systems [178], [179], [180]. It consists of two
major components: a consensus engine known as Tender-
mint Core and its underlying application interface, called
the Application BlockChain Interface (ABCI). The Tendermint
core is responsible for deploying the consensus algorithm,
whereas the ABCI can be utilised to deploy any blockchain
application using any programming language.
The consensus algorithm relies on a set of validators. It is
a round-based algorithm where a proposer is chosen from
a set of validators. In each round , the proposer proposes
a new block for the blockchain at the latest height. The
proposer itself is selected using a deterministic round-robin
algorithm, which ultimately relies on the voting power of
the validators. The voting power, on the other hand, is
proportional to the security deposit of the validators.
The consensus algorithm consists of three steps (pro-
pose, pre-vote, and pre-commit) in each round bound by
a timer equally divided among the three steps, thus making
it a weakly synchronous protocol. These steps signify the
transition of states in each validator. Figure 12 illustrates the
state transition diagram for each validator. At the beginning
of each round, a new proposer is chosen to propose a new
block. The proposed block needs to go through a two-stage
voting mechanism before it is committed to the blockchain.
When a validator receives the proposed block, it val-
idates the block at first, and if okay, it pre-votes for the
proposed block. If the block is not received within the
propose timer or the block is invalid, the validator submits
a special vote called Prevote nil. Then, the validator waits
for the pre-vote interval to receive pre-votes from the super-
majority (denoted as +2/3) of the validators. A +2/3 pre-
votes signifies that the super-majority validators have voted
for the proposed block, implying their confidence on the
proposed block and is denoted as a Polka in Tendermint
terminology. At this stage, the validator pre-commits the
block. If the validator does not receive enough pre-votes for
the proposed block, it submits another special vote called
Precommit nil. Then, the validator waits for the pre-commit
time-period to receive +2/3 pre-commits from the super-
majority of the validators. Once received, it commits the
block to the blockchain. If +2/3 pre-commits not received
within the pre-commit time-period, the next round is initiated
where a new proposer is selected, and the steps are repeated.
To ensure the safety guarantee of the algorithm, Tender-
mint is also coupled with locking rules. Once a validator
pre-commits a block after a polka is achieved, it must lock
itself onto that block. Then, it must obey the following two
rules:
• it must pre-vote for the same block in the next round
for the same blockchain height,
• the unlocking is possible only when a newer block
receives a polka in a later round for the same blockchain
height.
With these rules, Tendermint guarantees that the con-
sensus is secure when less than one-third validators exhibit
byzantine behaviour, meaning conflicting blocks will never
be committed at the same blockchain height. In other words,
Tendermint guarantees that no fork will occur under this as-
sumption. Since Tendermint favours safety over availability,
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Figure 12: Tendermint consensus steps.
it has one particular weakness. It requires 100% uptime of
its +2/3 (super-majority) validators. If more than one-third
(+1/3) are validators are offline or partitioned, the system
will stop functioning [178]. In such cases, out-of-protocol
steps are required to tackle this situation.
Unlike PoW or other PoS algorithms that come with
defined reward mechanisms and crypto-currency applica-
tions, the latest version of Tendermint more likely acts as the
consensus plugin, which can be retro-fit to other blockchain
systems. For example, Tendermint has been integrated with
a private instantiation of Ethereum in a Hyperledger project
called Burrows [209]. That is why there is no reward/pun-
ishment mechanism defined in Tendermint. However, it can
be easily introduced in the application layer via the ABCI.
For example, a reward mechanism can be introduced for
the proposer and the validator to motivate them to engage
in the consensus process. A node can become a validator by
bonding a certain amount of security deposit. The deposit is
destroyed, in case the corresponding validator misbehaves,
and thus acts as a deterrent for the validator to launch
any attack in the network. Together with the consensus
algorithm and a carefully designed reward and punishment
mechanism, all PoS attacks can be effectively handled.
2) CASPER THE FRIENDLY GHOST (CTFG). CTFG is a pure
BFT PoS algorithm that aims to transform Ethereum to a
PoS-only blockchain system in the future [182]. As described
above, CFFG is geared towards a gentle transition from a
PoW to a PoS model for Ethereum, where CTFG will take
control of the consensus mechanism ultimately.
CTFG is based upon a rigorous formal model called
Correction by Construction (CBC) that utilises the GHOST
(Greedy Heaviest-Observed Subtree) primitive as its con-
sensus rule during fork [183]. The idea is that the CTFG
protocol will be partially specified at the initial stage along
with a set of desired properties. Then, the rest of the protocol
is dynamically derived in such a way that it satisfies the de-
sired properties - hence the name correction by construction.
This is in contrast to the traditional approach for designing
a protocol where a protocol is fully defined at first, and then
it is tested to check if it satisfies the desired properties [156].
To achieve this, CTFG introduces a safety oracle, acting
as an ideal adversary, which raises exceptions when a fault
occurs and also approximates the probability of any future
failure. Based on this, the oracle can dynamically fine-tune
the protocol as required to evolve it towards its completion.
Similar to CFFG, CTFG also requires a set of bonded
validators that will bond ethers as a security deposit in a
smart-contract. However, unlike any other PoS mechanisms,
the validators will bet on the block, which has the highest
probability to be included in the main chain according to
their own perspective. If that particular block is included in
the main chain, the validators receive rewards for voting in
favour of the block. Otherwise, the validators receive certain
penalties.
Like any PoW algorithm, CTFG favours availability over
consistency. This means that blocks are not finalised in-
stantly, like Tendermint. Instead, as the chain grows and
more blocks are added, a previous block is considered impli-
citly final. A major advantage of CTFG over Tendermint is
that it can accommodate dynamic validators. This is because
the finality condition in Tendermint requires that its block
interval is short, which in turn demands a relatively lower
number of pre-determined validators. Since CTFG does not
rely on any instant finality, it can theoretically accommodate
a higher number of dynamic validators.
CTFG is currently is the most comprehensive proposal
which addresses all PoS attack vectors. However, it is to be
noted that this is just a proposal at the current stage. There-
fore, its performance in real settings is yet to be analysed.
3) OUROBOROS. Ouroboros is a provably secure PoS al-
gorithm [185], [186] utilised in the Cardano platform [187].
Cardano is regarded as third-generation blockchain system
supporting smart-contract and decentralised application
without relying on any PoW consensus algorithm.
In Ouroboros, only a stakeholder can participate in the
block minting process. A stakeholder is any node that holds
the underlying crypto-currency of the Cardano platform
called Ada. Ouroboros is based on the concept of epoch,
which is essentially a predefined time period. Each epoch
consists of several slots. A stakeholder is elected for each
slot to create a single block, meaning a block is created in
each slot. The selected stakeholder is called a slot leader and
is elected by a set of electors. An elector is a specific type of
stakeholder which has a certain amount Ada in its disposal.
In each epoch, the electors select the set of stakeholders
for the next epoch using an algorithm called Follow the
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Satoshi (FTS). The FTS algorithm relies on a random seed
to introduce a certain amount of randomness in the elec-
tion process. A share of the random seed is individually
generated by all electors who participate in a multiparty
computation protocol. Once the protocol is executed, all
electors posses the random seed, constructed with all of
their shares. The FTS algorithm utilises the random seed
to select a coin for a particular slot. The owner of the coin is
then elected as the slot leader. Intuitively, the more coins a
stakeholder possesses, the higher is its probability of being
selected as the slot leader.
Ouroboros is expected to provide a transaction fee based
reward to incentivise stakeholders to participate in the
minting process. However, the details are in the process
of being finalised. It has been mathematically proven to
be secure against almost all PoS attack vectors except the
cartel formation [185]. Nevertheless, how it will perform
once deployed is yet to be seen.
5.2.3 DPoS
There are several mechanisms deployed by different crypto-
currencies under the general category of DPoS. Next, we
present a few prominent approaches of some well-known
DPoS based crypto-currencies. Our analysis of these crypto-
currencies are summarised in Table 16.
1) EOS. EOS is the first and the most widely known
DPoS crypto-currency and smart-contract platform as of
now [188]. With the promise of greater scalability and
higher transactions per second than Ethereum, it raised 4
billion USD in the highest ever ICO event to date [190].
Initial EOS currency was created on the Ethereum platform,
and later migrated to their own blockchain network. The
DPoS consensus algorithm of EOS utilises 21 validators,
also known as Block Producers (BPs). These 21 validators are
selected with votes from EOS token (currency) holders. The
number of times a particular BP is selected to produce a
block is proportional to the total votes received from the
token holders.
Evey DPoS currency must create an initial supply before
the network is operational. This supply is used to select 21
BPs (with voting) as well as to reward the BPs for creating
blocks, and thus, securing the network. EOS had an initial
supply of 1 Billion EOS tokens with an annual inflation of
5%. Among the inflated currencies, 1% is used to reward
the block producers, whereas the rest of the 4% are kept
for future R&D for EOS [191]. Currently, an EOS block is
created in 0.5s. Blocks in EOS are produced in rounds where
each round consists of 21 blocks [192]. At the beginning of
each round, 21 BPs are selected. Next, each of them gets a
chance to create a block in pseduo-random fashion within
that particular round. Once a BP produces a block, other
BPs must validate the block and reach into a consensus. A
block is confirmed only when (+2/3) majority of the BPs
reach the consensus regarding the validity of the block. Once
this happens, the block and the associated transactions are
regarded as confirmed or final, so no fork can happen.
2) TRON. Tron is another popular DPoS based crypto-
currency [193]. With an initial supply of 99 Billion Tron
tokens (represented with TRX), it is another smart-contract
supported blockchain platform, very similar to Ethereum
and EOS in functionality. Its consensus mechanism utilises
27 validators, known as Super Representatives (SRs) [194].
The SRs are selected in every six hours with votes by TRX
holders who must freeze a certain amount of TRX to vote for
an SR. The deposits amount can be frozen back after three
days once the voting is cast [195]. A block in Tron is created
in every 3s for the corresponding SR receives a reward of 32
TRX. Another important feature of Tron is that there is no
in-built inflation mechanism in the protocol, which implies
that the total supply will remain constant throughout its
lifespan.
3) TEZOS. Tezos is, like EOS and Tron, a smart-contract plat-
form which utilises a variant of DPoS consensus algorithm
[196]. With a block reward of 16 XTZ (Tezos currency) and
block creation time of 60s, Tezos does not require any pre-
defined number of stakeholders (or Bakers as defined in
Tezos) [197]. This differs Tezos from other DPoS currencies.
Instead, the consensus mechanism utilises a dynamic range
of stakeholders where anyone holding a substantial amount
of XTZ can be a stakeholder. This limits general users
to participate in the consensus mechanism. To rectify this
problem, Tezos provides a mechanism by which anyone can
delegate their XTZ to someone so that it can accumulate the
required number of XTZ to be a baker. In return, the baker
would return a certain proportion of their received block
reward to the delegating party. Tezos started with an initial
supply of 765 Million XTZ tokens. It relies on an annual
inflation of 5.51% and the inflated currencies are used to
reward the bakers.
4) LISK. Lisk is a unique DPoS blockchain platform which,
enables the development of DApps using JavaScript [200].
Another unique feature of Lisk is its ability to accommodate
and then to operate with multiple blockchains, known as
sidechains along with a central blockchain called mainchain.
Each sidechain can be deployed and maintained by a
particular application provider, which needs to be synced
with the mainchain as per the Lisk’s protocol rule. In this
way, different applications can leverage different sidechains
simultaneously without burdening off the mainchain. Even
though the responsibility of maintaining a sidechain relies
on the particular application provider, the mainchain must
be maintained with the Lisk DPoS consensus protocol,
which utilises 101 delegates [201]. Only these delegates can
produce a block. These delegates are selected using votes
from Lisk currency (denoted with LSK) owners, where
each holder has 101 votes. The weight of each vote is
proportional to the amount of LSK owned by the respective
owner. The selection of delegates happens before a round,
where each round consists of 101 block generation cycle.
Thus, in a round, each delegate is randomly selected to
create a block. It has a block creation time of 10 seconds
and block reward of 5 LSK. Started with an initial supply
of 100 million LSK, Lisk has a current supply of 132 million
with an annual inflation of 5.65%.
5) ARK. Ark is yet another DPoS based blockchain platform
[202]. It utilises 51 delegates to create 51 blocks in each
round [203]. With a block creation time of 8s, each round
lasts for 408s. Each delegate receives 2 ARK (the native
currency of the ARK platform) for creating a block. It had
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an initial supply of 125 million. With an annual inflation
of 5.55, the supply was around 142 million (as of June
2019). Like other DPoS blockchains, the delegates in Ark
are also selected with votes by Ark currency owner, where
the weight of each is proportional to the amount of ARK
owned by the voter.
5.2.4 Limitations of PoS
Even though the variants of different PoS algorithms offer
several significant advantages, there are still a few disad-
vantages in these classes of algorithms. We explore these
disadvantages below.
• Collusion: If the number of validators is not large
enough, it might be easier to launch a 51% attack on the
corresponding consensus algorithm by colluding with
other validators.
• Wealth effect: The sole reliance on coin-wealth in a
consensus algorithm or for the selection of validators
creates an environment where people with a large por-
tion of coins can exert greater influence.
In addition to these disadvantages, there have been a few
other attack vectors identified for the PoS algorithms:
• Nothing-at-stake (NAS) attack [157]: During a block-
chain fork, an attacker might attempt to add its newly
created block in all forked branches to increase their
probability to add their block as the valid block. Such
scenario is unlikely to occur in any PoW algorithm.
This is because a miner would need to share their
resources in order to mine at different branches. This
would eventually decrease their chance of finding a
new block because of the resources shared in multiple
branches. Since it does not cost anything for a minter
in a PoS algorithm to add blocks in multiple parallel
branches, the attacker is motivated to do so. Applying
a penalty for such misbehaviour could effectively tackle
this problem.
• Bribing (short-range, SR) attack [157], [176]: In this
attack, an attacker tries to double spend by creating a
fork. An example of this attack would be as follows. The
attacker pays to a seller to buy a good. The seller waits
for a certain number of blocks (e.g., six blocks) before
the good is delivered to the attacker. Once delivered,
the attacker forks the main chain at the block (e.g., six
blocks back, which is relatively short and hence the
name) in which the payment was made. Then, the at-
tacker bribes other minters to mint on top of the forked
branch. As long as the bribed amount is lower than
the price of the delivered good, it is always profitable
for the attacker. The colluding minter has nothing to
lose if it is coupled with the nothing-at-stake attack on
their part but can gain from the bribery. Again, it can
be tackled by introducing a penalty mechanism for all
misbehaving parties.
• Long-range (LR) attack [157]: In this attack, the attacker
attempts to build an alternative blockchain starting
from the earliest blocks if the attacker can collude with
the majority of the stakeholders. The motivation might
be similar to double spending or related issues provid-
ing advantages to the attacker as well as the colluded
stakeholders. As explained above, the colluded stake-
holder has nothing to lose if it can be coupled with the
nothing-at-stake attacks. Check-pointing is one of the
methods by which it can be tackled. The check-pointing
codifies a certain length of the blockchain to make it
immutable up to that point, and thereby undermining
the attack. This is because the attacker cannot fork the
blockchain before that check-point.
• Coin-age accumulation (CAC) attack [157], [176]: The
PoS algorithms that rely on the uncapped coin-age
parameter are susceptible to this attack. In this attack,
the attacker waits for their coins to accumulate enough
coin-age to exploit the algorithm for launching double
spends by initiating a fork. This attack can be tackled
by introducing a cap on the coin-age which minimises
the attack vector.
• Pre-computing (PreCom) attack [157], [155]: A pre-
computing attack, also known as Stake-grinding attack,
would allow an attacker to increase the probability of
generating subsequent blocks based on the information
of the current block. If there is not enough randomness
included in the PoS algorithm, the attacker can attempt
to pre-compute subsequent blocks by fine-tuning in-
formation of the current block. For a particular set of
information (e.g., a set of transactions), if the attacker
finds that the probability of minting a few subsequent
blocks is less than desired, the attacker can update
the set of transactions to increase their probability of
determining the next few blocks. It can be effectively
tackled by introducing a secure source of randomness
in the algorithm.
• Cartel formation (CAF) attack [158]: In economic the-
ory, an oligopoly market is dominated by a small set of
entities having greater influence or wealth than other
entity. They can collude with one another by forming a
cartel to control price or reduce competition within the
market. It has been argued that ”Blockchain architecture
is mechanism design for oligopolistic markets.” [159] which
affects both PoW and PoS algorithms. Such a cartel can
launch 51% attacks on the PoS algorithm or exploit the
stakes to monopolise the PoS algorithm.
5.2.5 Analysis
In this section, we summarise the properties of different
PoS algorithms utilising the taxonomies and PoS attack
vectors in Table 17, Table 18, Table 19 and Table 20. Like
before, a ‘ ’ symbol has been utilised to indicate if the
corresponding algorithm supports a particular property,
and the ‘X’ symbol signifies that the particular property
is not supported. The ‘-’ symbol implies that the property
is not applicable, whereas the symbol ‘?’ indicates that no
information has been found for that particular feature. For
other properties, explanatory texts have been used as well.
From Table 17, only chained algorithms are based on
multiple committee utilising a flat topology with a dynamic
configuration. These algorithms also use a probabilistic lot-
tery to select a minter. Conversely, other PoS algorithms, ex-
cept Tendermint, are based on the single committee having
an open type and explicit formation with a dynamic config-
uration and mostly rely on voting mechanisms. Tendermint
uses a closed committee with a static configuration.
As per Table 18, none of the algorithms, except Tender-
mint requires any node to be authenticated to participate
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Table 16: Comparison of DPoS Currencies with ‘-’ signifying not applicable.
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Initial supply Inflation Current supply
(23.05.2019)
Block reward Block Time Validator
nos
EOS 01.07.2017 1 Billion 5% 1.04 Billion 1% of inflated
currency divided
among 21
validators
0.5s 21
Tron 28.08.2017 99 Billion - 99 Billion 32 TRX 3s 27
Tezos 30.06.2018 765 Million 5.51% 795 Million 16 XTZ 60s Not pre-
defined
Lisk 24.05.2016 100 Million 5.67% 132 Million 5 LSK 10s 101
Ark 21.03.2017 125 Million 5.55% 142 Million 2 ARK 8s 51
in the algorithm. All of them have strong support for non-
repudiation in the form of digital signature as part of every
single transaction. These algorithms have a high level of
censorship resistance, as do all PoW algorithms. As for
the attack vector, each PoS algorithm requires every miner
node to invest substantially to participate in this algorithm.
This feature, thus, acts as a deterrent against any Sybil or
DoS attack in any PoS algorithm. The adversary tolerance
for Chained systems can be calculated using this formula:
min(2f + 1, 3f + 1) = 3f + 1. This is because a chained
algorithm utilises both PoW and PoS algorithms and thus
needs to consider the adversary tolerance for both of them.
We consider the minimum of these two (3f + 1). The
supported adversary tolerance for other algorithms is 3f+1
except BFT Ouroboros whose adversary tolerance is 2f + 1.
According to Table 20, all BFT, and DPoS algorithms
have considerably high throughput, low latency, and high
scalability. Their energy consumption is negligible. How-
ever, the chained algorithms have a comparatively lower
throughput, lower scalability, and higher latency with re-
spect to their BFT and DPoS counterparts. The fault toler-
ance of chained and BFT algorithms is 2f + 1 like any BFT
algorithm, implying they can achieve consensus as long as
more than 50% of nodes function properly. However, DPoS
algorithm requires a 3f + 1 fault tolerance.
Table 19 outlines a comparison of additional attack vec-
tors with symbols representing the usual semantics. CTFG,
Tentermint, and Ouroboros have mitigation mechanisms
against these attack vectors. However, Casper FFG, and
any DPoS algorithms cannot successfully defend against
the cartel formation attack. Peercoin, on the other hand,
has mechanism against this cartel formation attack, unfor-
tunately, suffers from all other attack vectors.
Finally, a comparison of the selected DPoS crypto-
currencies is presented in Table 16.
6 INCENTIVISED CONSENSUS: BEYOND POW AND
POS
Some consensus algorithms take a different approach in
which they do not solely rely on any PoW or PoS mech-
anism. Instead, they use an approach in which a PoW/-
PoS mechanism is combined with another approach. We
consider such algorithms as hybrid algorithms which are
presented in Section 6.1. Other approaches adopt a more
drastic approach in which they do not leverage any
type PoW/PoS algorithm whatsoever. Such algorithms are
tagged as N-POS/POW (to symbolise Non-PoS/PoW) al-
gorithms and discussed in Section 6.2.
6.1 Hybrid Consensus
In this section, we outline a new breed of consensuses
algorithms that combine either a PoW or PoS algorithm
or both with another novel algorithm or mechanism, thus
creating a hybrid mechanism.
1) PROOF OF RESEARCH (POR). Proof of research is a
hybrid approach that combines proof-of-stake with the
proof-of-BOINC [160]. BOINC stands for Berkeley Open
Infrastructure for Network Computing [162]. It is a grid
computing platform widely used by scientific researchers
in different domains by allowing them to exploit the idle
computing resources of personal computers around the
world. With the proof-of-BOINC, a researcher has to prove
his contribution for the BOINC research work.
The PoR mechanism is leveraged by Gridcoin [160],
[161], a crypto-currency that can be earned by anyone by
sharing their computing resources with the BOINC pro-
ject. The mechanism by which PoS and Proof-of-BOINC
are tied together for the PoR is explained next [161]. The
PoS mechanism is similar to the traditional PoS algorithm.
Anyone can become a minter, known as Investor in Gridcoin
terminology, by owning a certain amount of Gridcoin and
participating in the minting process. In addition to this,
other users, known as Researchers in Gridcoin terminology,
can also participate in the minting process. Interestingly, an
investor can also be a researcher and thus, can increase their
amount of grid coin earned.
For this, a researcher installs the BOINC software and
registers a project from the BOINC whitelist with his email
address. The researcher is assigned a unique cross project
identifier (CPID) and starts downloading the work share.
Once the computation is completed, the researcher returns
the result with a credit recommendation for the completed
workload. The recommendation is compared with that of
another researcher, and the minimum credit is rewarded.
This workload credit data is stored in the header of each
block and the researcher is rewarded with the corresponding
amount of Gridcoin. To summarise, the consensus mechan-
ism is mostly dominated by the PoS mechanism with Proof-
of-BOINC acts as a reward mechanism for sharing unused
computing resources available to the researchers. Hence, its
security is similar to that of the traditional PoS algorithm.
2) SLIMCOIN’S PROOF-OF-BURN (POB). The Proof-of-Burn
is a consensus algorithm proposed by Ian Stewart as an
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Table 17: Comparing structural properties of PoS Consensus Algorithms.
Single committee Multiple committeeConsensus
/System Node type Type Formation Configuration Topology Configuration Mechanism
Chained
(PeerCoin)
Clients, Miners
& Minters
- - - Flat Dynamic Probabilistic lottery
Chained
(CFFG)
Clients, Miners
& Validators
- - - Flat Dynamic Probabilistic lottery
BFT
(Tendermint)
Clients &
Validators
Open (Close) Explicit Dynamic (Static) - - Voting
BFT (CTFG) Clients &
Validators
Open Explicit Dynamic - - ?
BTFG
(Ouroboros)
Clients,
Electors &
Stakeholders
Open Explicit Dynamic Voting
DPoS Clients &
Validators
Open Explicit Dynamic - - Voting
Table 18: Comparing security properties of PoS Consensus Algorithms.
Attack VectorsConsensus
/System Authentication Non-repudiation
Censorship
resistance Adversary tolerance Sybil protection DoS Resistance
Chained
(PeerCoin)
X High 3f + 1
Chained
(CFFG)
X High 3f + 1
BFT
(Tendermint)
(In close
type), X (In
open type)
High 3f + 1
BFT (CTFG) X High 3f + 1
BFT
(Ouroboros)
X High 2f + 1
DPoS X High 3f + 1
Table 19: Comparison of additional attack vectors protection among PoS Consensus Algorithms
Consensus\System Nothing-at-Stake Bribing Long-range Coin-age Pre-computing Cartel formation
Chained (PeerCoin) X X X X X
Chained (Casper FFG) X
BFT (Tendermint)
BFT (CTFG)
BFT (Ouroboros)
DPoS X
Table 20: Comparing performance properties of PoS Consensus Algorithms.
Consensus\System Fault
tolerance
Throughput Scalability Latency Energy consumption
Chained (PeerCoin,
CFFG)
2f + 1 Medium Medium Medium Medium
BFT (Tendermint,
CTFG, Ouroboros)
2f + 1 High High Low Low
DPoS 3f + 1 High High Low Low
alternative to PoW [163]. In PoW, miners need to invest in
building a mining rig in order to participate in the mining
process. In PoB, miners need to burn their coins in order to
participate in the mining process. Burning coins mean that
sending coins to an address without the private key and
thus never usable. Thus, burning coins is an analogous idea
to the investment for building a mining rig. The amount
of burning has a positive correlation with the possibility
of being selected for mining the next block. This is similar
to the PoW system, where the miners increasingly invest
in modern equipment to maintain the hash power, as the
incentive decays with the complexity.
Slimcoin is a crypto-currency which utilises the idea of
PoB in combination with PoW and PoS [164], [165], thus
creating a hybrid consensus mechanism. Algorithmically,
their idea is similar to the chained PoS algorithm of Peercoin
as presented in in Section 5.2.1 with additional PoB mech-
anism sandwiched in between PoW and PoS algorithms.
The PoW is used to generate the initial coin supply using
the mechanism of Bitcoin. When the system has sufficient
amount of money supply, it plans to switch to a hybrid of
PoW and PoS mechanism similar to Peercoin where PoB will
be used to select the miner. As this happens, the minters
will need to burn their accumulated coins in order to be
eligible to participate in the PoS minting process. Since PoB
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algorithm is mostly used for minter selections, it has hardly
any effect on the security of the system. Hence, its security
and other properties are mostly similar to that of Peercoin.
3) PROOF OF STAKE-VELOCITY (POSV). One of the major
limitations of coin-age based PoS is that there is no incentive
(or lack of penalty thereof) for the minters to be online to
participate in the staking process. This is because that the
coin-age increases linearly over time, without the need for
the stakeholders to be online and participate in the staking
process. They can, therefore, choose to participate for a short
period and then collect the reward and may go offline again.
The lack of participants may facilitate attacks at a certain
time.
To counteract this problem, a crypto-currency called
Reddcoin proposed a novel hybrid algorithm called Proof of
Stake-Velocity (PoSV) [166], [168]. The central to the PoSV is
the idea of a mechanism called the velocity of stakes coupled
with any traditional PoS algorithm. Conceptually, the velo-
city of stake mirrors the notion of the velocity of money,
a terminology from Economics implying the frequency of
money flow within the society [169]. Indeed, the velocity
of stakes evolves around the idea of increasing the flow of
stakes during the PoS consensus mechanism [167]. This (the
flow of stakes) can be achieved if the minters are encour-
aged to actively participate in the consensus mechanism by
staking their crypto-currency, instead of holding their coins
offline. This process in a way will also increase the overall
security of the system and counteract the lack of participant
issue in PoS.
To facilitate this PoSV introduces a non-linear coin-
ageing function in which the coin-age of a particular coin
is gained much faster in the first few days and weeks than
the gain in later weeks. For example, it has been estimated
that minters who stake their coins every two weeks or less,
can earn up to 20% more than people who do not participate
in the staking process [167]. Such incentives encourage the
minters to increase the velocity of stakes in the whole
network. Note that PoSV is similar to any PoS mechanism
along with its properties and hence, not explored in detail
here.
6.2 N-POS/POW
The consensuses algorithms presented in this category do
not rely any way on either PoW or PoS algorithms. Instead,
they rely on completely novel mechanisms. Therefore, we
call them N-POS/PoW algorithms for the convenience of
group naming.
1) PROOF-OF-COOPERATION (POC). The Proof-of-
Cooperation is a consensus algorithm introduced by the
FairCoin crypto-currency [170], [171]. This consensus
algorithm relies on several special nodes known as Certified
Validating Nodes (CVNs). CVNs function similar to the way
validators act in a DPoS consensus algorithm as utilised by
EOS or Tron crypto-currencies, as they are nodes which can
create blocks in Faircoin using the PoC consensus algorithm.
However, unlike any DPoS validators, each CVN node is
authenticated by their corresponding Faircoin identifier as
well as trusted following a set of community-based rules
and technical requirements [171]. The community rules
state that a candidate node willing to be a CVN must
participate in Faircoin community activities by performing
some tasks. Examples of these tasks are running a local
node or contributing to any technical or management issue
related to Faircoin which must be confirmed by at least two
active members of the community. Besides, the candidate
node must follow a set of technical requirements such
as 24/7 network availability and a special cryptographic
hardware used for signature generation.
With the involvement of CVNs selected in the previously
discussed manner, the core mechanism for PoC consensus
algorithm is briefly discussed next. Blocks in Faircoin are
created in a round-robin fashion in every three minutes
of epoch by one of the CVNs. To create a new block,
a CVN needs to be selected using a deterministic voting
mechanism individually carried out by every single CVN in
the network. The steps of this mechanism are:
• Each CVN finds the CVN, which has created a block
furthest in the chain by traversing backwards through
the chain.
• Next, it is checked if the found CVN has been active
recently in the network by looking for its signature in
the last few blocks. If so, this CVN will be selected as
the next CVN.
• Then, each node creates a data set consisting of the hash
of the last block, the ID of the selected CVN for the next
block, and its own CVN ID, which is then signed by the
specified cryptographic hardware. The created dataset,
along with the signature, is then propagated through
the network.
• The selected CVN receives this dataset along with their
signature from multiple CVNs and verifies each signa-
ture. As soon as the selected CVN finds that more than
50% CVNs have selected it to be the next block creator,
it can be certain that its turn is next at the end of the
current epoch, i.e., three minutes.
• The selected CVN adds all pending transactions into a
new block, along with all the received signatures, and
propagates the block in the network.
• Upon receiving the block, other CVNs verify the block
by checking the if the CVN who created the block is
actually the one selected as the block creator as well
as validating all signatures in it and its transactions. If
the verification is successful, the block is added to the
blockchain and the same mechanism continues.
2) PROOF OF IMPORTANCE (POI). PoS gives an unfair
advantage to coin hoarders. The more coins they keep in
their accounts, the more they earn. This means the rich get
richer and everyone has an incentive to save coins instead of
spending them. To solve these issues NEM has introduced
a novel consensus mechanism called “Proof of Importance
(PoI)” [172]. It functions similarly to PoS: nodes need to
’vest’ an amount of currency to be eligible for creating blocks
and are selected for creating a block roughly in proportion to
some score. In Proof-of-stake, this ’score’ is one’s total vested
amount, but in PoI, this score includes more variables. All
the nodes that have more than 10000 XEM (the correspond-
ing crypto-currency of XEM) are theoretically given equal
positive importance and with 9B XEM coins there can be
maximum 900K such nodes. However, the actual number
of such nodes and their importance vary with time and their
25
amount of transaction in XEM.
The calculations borrow from the math of network clus-
tering and page ranking. At a high level, the primary inputs
are:
• Net transfers: how much has been spent in the past
30 days, with more recent transactions weighted more
heavily.
• Vested amount of currency for purposes of creating
blocks.
• Cluster nodes: accounts that are part of interlinked
clusters of activity are weighted slightly more heavily
than outliers or hubs (which link clusters but not part
of them).
In NEM, the importance of an account depends only
on the net transfers of XEMs from that account. To be
considered for the importance estimation at a certain block
height, h , a node must have transferred at least 100 XEMs
during the last 30 days or 43, 200 blocks. The “importance
score” addresses two primary criticisms of proof-of-stake.
One risk is that people hoard many coins as possible
and reap the rewards from block creation. This concentrates
wealth while discouraging transactions. The importance
score means that hoarding will result in a lower score while
spreading XEM around will increase it. Being a merchant
pays better than having a hoard.
6.3 Analysis
In this section, we summarise the properties of different Hy-
brid and N-Pow/PoS algorithms utilising the taxonomies in
Table 21, Table 22, Table 23 and Table 24. Like before, ‘-’
signifies that the corresponding property is not applicable
for the respective consensus algorithm, ‘?’ indicates that the
information the property has not been found, a ‘ ’ is used
to indicate an algorithm satisfies a particular property and
‘X’ is used to imply the reverse (not satisfied).
Table 21 presents the comparison of structural properties
for the corresponding consensus algorithms. Among them,
PoR and PoB depend on a multiple committee formation
with a flat topology and dynamic configuration. Conversely,
PoSV and PoI use an open single committee with a dynamic
configuration, and probabilistic lottery as their underlying
mechanism. PoC has an implicit, open, and dynamic single
committee, which relies on voting mechanism.
All these algorithms have an adversary tolerance of
3f+1 with the support of non-repudiation, Sybil protection,
DoS resistance, and high censorship resistance as reported
in Table 22. Entities in PoB, PoSV, and PoI do no require to be
authenticated while PoC entities must be authenticated, and
researchers in PoR need to be authenticated. However, other
entities in PoW can remain non-authenticated, as indicated
with the ‘X’ symbol in the table. All of them except PoC
and PoI have 3f + 1 adversary tolerance because of their
usage of PoS algorithms. We have not found any regarding
adversary tolerance for PoC and PoI.
Table 23 presents the comparison of some additional
attack vectors for the Hybrid algorithms. As evident from
the table, since these algorithms utilise PoS as one of their
consensus algorithms, they suffer from the similar limita-
tions of any PoS algorithm. For example, none of them has
any guard against most of these additional attack vectors.
The only exception is PoB which is because of its use of
Peercoin like functionality, can resist the cartel formation
attack.
The comparison of the performance properties for these
algorithms is presented in Table 24. All of them have 2f + 1
fault tolerance except PoC and PoI as we have not found
any information fault tolerance for PoC and PoI. In terms of
Scalability, Latency and Energy, every algorithm except PoB
exhibits similar characteristics: they have high throughput,
consume low energy, and have low latency, meaning they
reach finality quickly. Because of its reliance on PoW, PoB
has low scalability, low latency, and also consume meidum
energy. In terms of throughput, PoR, PoSV and PoI have
high throughput, whereas PoC has a low throughput and
PoB has a medium throughput.
Finally, a comparison of the selected Hybrid and N-
PoW/PoS crypto-currencies is presented in Table 25.
7 NON-INCENTIVISED CONSENSUS
In this section, we present non-incentivised consensus
algorithms that are used in private blockchain systems
well-suited for non-crypto-currency applications. These al-
gorithms are mostly based on classical consensus algorithms
with special features added for their adoption for the corres-
ponding blockchain systems.
One of the major initiatives within the private blockchain
sphere is the Hyperledger project, which is an industry-
wide effort [206]. Founded by the Linux Foundation, it is
a consortium of some of the major tech vendors of the
world. It provides an umbrella to facilitate the development
of different types of open source projects utilising private
blockchains with a specific focus to address issues involving
business and governmental use-cases. Currently, there are
six major projects within Hyperledger: Hyperledger Fabric
[207], Hyperledger Sawtooth [208], Hyperledger Burrow
[209], Hyperledger Iroha [210] and Hyperledger Indy [211].
Each of them is analysed below with a brief introduction.
7.1 Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric is the first major private blockchain
system that originated from the Hyperledger ecosystem
[207]. It has been designed with strong privacy in mind
to ensure that different businesses organisations, including
governmental entities, can take advantage of a blockchain
system in different use-cases. A crucial capability of Fabric
is that it can maintain multiple ledgers within its ecosystem.
This is a useful feature, which separates Fabric from other
blockchain systems consisting of only one ledger in each of
their domains.
A key strength of Fabric is its modular design and
pluggable features. For example, Fabric is not dependant
on a particular format of ledger data, which is useful in
several use-cases. In addition, the consensus mechanism
is fully pluggable. Therefore, different types of consensus
algorithms can be used in different situations.
As part of its consensus process, Fabric utilises a special
entity called Orderer, which is responsible for creating a
new block and extending the ledger by adding the block
in the appropriate order. In addition, there are other entit-
ies known as endorsers. Each endorser is responsible for
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Table 21: Comparing structural properties of Hybrid and N-POS/POW Consensus Algorithms.
Single committee Multiple committeeConsensus
/System Node type Type Formation Configuration Topology Configuration Mechanism
PoR Clients
(Researchers) &
Minters
- - - Flat Dynamic Probabilistic lottery
PoB Clients, Miners
& Minters
- - - Flat Dynamic Probabilistic lottery
PoSV Clients &
Minters
Open Implicit Dynamic Probabilistic lottery
PoC Clients & CVNs Open Explicit Dynamic - - Voting
PoI Clients &
transaction
partners
Open Implicit Dynamic - - Probabilistic lottery
Table 22: Comparing security properties of Hybrid and N-POS/POW Consensus Algorithms.
Attack VectorsConsensus Authentication Non-repudiation Censorship
resistance
Adversary tolerance Sybil protection DoS Resistance
PoR X/ High 3f + 1
PoB X High 3f + 1
PoSV X High 3f + 1
PoC High ?
PoI X High ?
Table 23: Comparison of additional attack vectors protection for Hybrid and N-POS/POW Consensus Algorithms
Consensus
/System Nothing-at-Stake Bribing Long-range Coin-age Pre-computing Cartel formation
PoR X X X X X X
PoB X X X X X
PoSV X X X X X X
Table 24: Comparing performance properties of Consensus Algorithms of Hybrid and N-POS/POW.
Consensus Fault
tolerance
Throughput Scalability Latency Energy
PoR 2f + 1 High Medium Low Low
PoB 2f + 1 Medium Low Medium Medium
PoSV 2f + 1 High Medium Low Low
PoC ? LoW (10.6 TPS [173]) Medium Low LoW
PoI ? High Medium Low Low
Table 25: Hybrid & Non-PoW/PoS currencies
Currency Genesis date
(dd.mm.yyyy)
Block reward Total supply Consensus Block Time
Gridcoin 24 Mar 2016 Minting 42 Million PoR, PoS 1 minute
Slimcoin May 2014 50-250 coins 133 Million PoB, PoW, PoS 1.5 minutes
Reddcoin January 20,
2014
Block reward 2.8 Billion PoSV 1 minute
Faircoin 6th of March,
2014.
Block reward 5.3 Million PoC Depends on
Time-weight
Parameter
Burst 11 August 2014 Reduces at a fixed rate
of 5 percent each month
204 Million PoC 4 minutes
NEM March 31st,
2015
transaction fees only +
node rewards
899 Million PoI 1 minute
validating and endorsing a transaction where it checks if
an entity is allowed to perform a certain action in a ledger
encoded within the transaction. Other participating entities
are general users who create transactions. All the entities,
including the Orderer(s) and the endorsers, are registered
and authenticated via a Fabric specific special entity called
Membership Service Provider (MSP). The MSP is responsible
for managing the identities of all participants in the ledger.
Using this identity layer, it is possible to create security
policies that dictate which entities can perform what actions
within a specific ledger. A simple flow of a consensus
process in Fabric is illustrated in Figure 13.
The number of Orderer can be increased to distribute the
ordering service. Currently, it supports SOLO and Kafka. A
SOLO ordering service consists of just one single orderer
and hence, cannot provide any type of fault tolerance. That
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A All required entities are registered in the MSP.
B A channel with a ledger is initiated. In addition, a
policy is created containing the endorsement criteria
as well as other security and privacy criteria.
C A chaincode (smart-contract written either in Java or
Go) is deployed in the ledger.
D When an entity wishes to invoke certain functions in
the chaincode to read data from the ledger or to write
data into the ledger, it submits a transaction proposal
to all the required endorsers as dictated in the policy.
E Each endorser validates the proposal, executes the
chaincode and returns a proposal response consisting
of other ledger data.
F The proposal, its response, and other ledger data are
encoded as a transaction and sent to the Orderer.
G The Orderer creates a block using the transaction and
returns the block to the endorsers.
H Each endorser validates the block and, if validated,
extends the ledger by attaching the new block. This
essentially updates the state of the ledger.
Figure 13: A simple flow of a consensus process in Fabric.
is why it is not recommended to utilise the SOLO model
in the deployed system and has only been provided for
initial testing. On the other hand, the Kafka Orderer utilises
a Kafka cluster for deploying distributed Orderers. Kafka
is a distributed streaming platform with a pub-sub archi-
tecture [212] and is coupled with Zookeeper, a distributed
coordination service [213]. At this point, the Kafka Orderer
is the only recommended setting for achieving consensus
in Fabric. An SBFT (Simplified Byzantine Fault Tolerance)
based consensus algorithm is currently being developed and
is to be released soon.
7.2 Hyperledger Sawtooth
Hyperledger Sawtooth, initially developed by Intel, is a
software framework for creating distributed ledgers suitable
for a variety of use cases [208]. Sawtooth utilises a novel
consensus algorithm called Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET),
which depends on Intel SGX (Software Guard Extension).
Intel SGX is a new type of Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE) integrated into the new generation of Intel processors.
SGX enables the execution of code within a secure enclave
inside the processor, whose validity can be verified using a
remote attestation process supported by the SGX.
PoET, similar to the Nakamoto consensus algorithm in
Bitcoin, relies on the concept of electing a leader in each
round to propose a block to be added in the ledger. The
difference is that the Nakamoto algorithm and its variants
select a leader by a lottery mechanism, which utilises com-
puting power to generate a proof, as described previously.
However, PoET solely relies on the Intel SGX capability to
elect a leader. During each round, every validator node
in the network, requests for a wait time from a trusted
function in the SGX enclave. The validator that is assigned
the shortest waiting time is elected as the leader for that
round. The winning validator then can propose a block,
consisting of a series of transactions from the defined trans-
action family. Other validators can utilise a trusted function
supported by SGX to assess whether a trusted function has
assigned the shortest time to the winning validator, and
the winning validator has waited the specified amount of
time. Furthermore, other validators verify the validity of
the block before it is included in the ledger. The inclusion
of the PoET as a consensus algorithm enables Sawtooth to
achieve massive scalability as it does not need to solve a
hard, computationally intensive cryptographic puzzle. In
addition, it allows Sawtooth to be used not only for a
permissioned ledger, but also for a public ledger.
7.3 Hyperledger Burrow
Hyperledger Burrow is a private (permissioned) deploy-
ment of the Ethereum platform [209]. It has been created
and then deposited to the Hyperledger code-base by Monax
Industries Limited [214]. The core component in Burrow
is a permissioned version of the EVM (Ethereum Virtual
Machine) to ensure that only authorised entities can execute
code. Two additional components have been added: Byz-
antine fault-tolerant Tendermint protocol [179], [221] and
the RPC gateway.
The Tendermint consensus falls under the category of
a Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithm, which can
be used to achieve consensus even under the Byzantine
behaviour of a certain number of nodes as presented in
Section 5.2.2.
Burrow depends on several validators, which are known
(authorised) entities with the duty to validate each block
utilising the Tendermint consensus algorithm. This al-
gorithm allows consensus to be achieved in Burrow with
1/3 nodes exhibiting Byzantine behaviour, either acting
maliciously or having been down due to network or system
failure.
Since Burrow utilises the EVM, a wide-range of smart-
contracts and DApps (Decentralised Applications) could
be deployed. Using the Tendermint algorithm with a set
of known validators allows Burrow to scale at a much
faster rate than Ethereum while preserving the privacy of
transactions by allowing only known entities to participate
in the network.
7.4 Hyperledger Iroha
Hyperledger Iroha is a private blockchain system initially
developed by Soramitsu, Hitachi, NTT Data, and Colu
and is currently hosted by Linux foundation under the
Hyperledger Project [210], [215]. Iroha aims to create a
simple blockchain infrastructure which can be incorporated
into any system which requires a blockchain architecture
underneath to function. The major emphasis while design-
ing Iroha is on a simpler construction with a strong focus
on mobile-friendly application development using a novel
consensus mechanism called YAC (Yet Another Consensus)
[215], [216]. One fundamental different of Iroha from other
Hyperledger project is its fine-grained permission control
mechanism which allows defining permissions for all relev-
ant commands, queries, and even joining in the network.
The core architecture consists of several components
[216], [219]. A brief description of its major components is
presented below:
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• Troii represents the entry point of any application to
the Iroha network. It utilises gRPC (gRPC Remote Pro-
cedure Calls [218]), an open source RPC framework,
to interact with different peers and entities within the
blockchain network.
• Model represents how different entities are represented
within the system and defines the mechanism to inter-
act with them.
• Network provides the network functionalities required
to maintain the P2P network and to propagate transac-
tions in the network.
• Consensus facilitates the functionalities related to
achieving consensus in the network using the YAC
consensus protocol, a practical byzantine fault-tolerant
algorithm (discussed below).
• Simulator provides a mechanism to simulate the effects
of transactions on the chain by creating a temporary
snapshot of the chain state.
• Validator allows the validation of transactions by veri-
fying its formats and signature along with the veri-
fication of business rules and policies involved in the
transactions. There are two types of validations in Iroha:
– Stateless validation checks for transaction formats and
signature.
– Stateful validation checks the business rules and
policies, e.g., if a certain action is allowed by an entity.
• Synchroniser is a part of the consensus component and
is responsible for synchronising the chain to a new or
disconnected node.
• Ametsuchi is the storage component of Iroha and is
used to store the blocks and the chain state known as
World State View (WSV).
These components are used by three core entities within
the architecture [216]:
• Clients are applications that they can query data from
the allowed Iroha chain as well as can perform certain
actions, called commands, by which the state of the
chain is updated. For each of these, clients need to
interact with the peer.
• Peers are nodes that have the following two functional-
ities:
– To maintain a copy of the ledger. Applications can
thus interact with a peer to query a chain or to submit
transactions to update the chain.
– To participate in the consensus process by maintain-
ing its address, identity and trust as a single entity in
the network.
• Ordering service node(s): Like Fabric, ordering service
nodes are responsible for ordering transactions and
creating a proposal of a block.
With these components and entities, a flow of transac-
tions in Iroha is briefly presented in Figure 14 [216].
7.5 Hyperledger Indy
Hyperledger Indy is a private blockchain system purpose-
fully built for providing an ecosystem for blockchain-based
self-sovereign identity [211], [222]. The concept of Self-
Sovereign Identity has been initially promoted by the Sovrin
foundation [223], a non-profit international entity consisting
A A client prepares and sends a transaction to a peer
using Troii.
B The peer performs stateless validation to the trans-
action and forwards the transaction to the ordering
service using an ordering gate.
C The ordering service combines and orders transac-
tions from different peers in a transaction proposal
which is then broadcast to the peers.
D Each peer performs a stateful validation of the pro-
posal using the simulator and creates a block con-
sisting of only verified transactions. Each peer signs
the block, generates a hash of the proposed block
and finally, creates a tuple containing the hash and
the signature. Such a tuple is called a vote. The block
and the vote are then internally sent to the consensus
gate to initiate the YAC mechanism.
E The YAC mechanism in each peer prepares an
ordered list of voting peers utilising the hashes
created in the previous step. The first peer in the
list is regarded as the leader and is responsible for
aggregating votes from other voting peers.
F After aggregating all votes from the voting peers, the
leader computes the supermajority (usually 2/3rd)
of votes for a certain hash (signifying a block).
G Once a supermajority for a proposed block is
achieved, the leader propagates a commit message
for this particular block to all voting peers.
H Each voting peer verifies the commit message and
adds the block to the blockchain.
Figure 14: A flow of transactions in Iroha.
of several private organisations to promote the notion of
Self-sovereign Identity. The Indy project is closely associated
with the Sovrin foundation focusing on materialising this
notion of a self-sovereign identity system as a public identity
utility.
Currently, Indy consists of the following two major com-
ponents:
• Indy-plenum: Plenum is the underlying distributed
ledger (blockchain) construct of the Indy platform. Like
any distributed ledger, the Plenum ledger is fundament-
ally an ordered log of transactions. In addition, it consists
of several nodes, among which a single or a few chosen
ones act as the leader responsible for ordering the trans-
actions. The nodes execute a consensus protocol which
utilises a three-phase commit to reach agreement among
themselves regarding the order of the transactions.
• Indy-SDK: This provides the required software APIs and
tools to enable other software to interact with the Plenum
ledger. It hides all the intricate internals from the users of
the platform so that the platform can be utilised without
even knowing the complexities of the ledger and its asso-
ciated consensus protocol.
The consensus protocol utilised in Indy is called RBFT
(Redundant Byzantine Fault Tolerance) [224]. Like any other
byzantine fault tolerance protocol, it relies on 3f + 1 nodes
(a participant in the consensus protocol) in order to handle
f byzantine nodes [224], [225]. For example, it requires
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four deployed nodes in order to handle a single byzantine
node. Each participating node in RBFT deploys two (or
more) protocol instances, aptly called Master and Backup
protocol instance, each of which is executed in parallel. A
separate primary node (also called a leader) is selected from
the master and the backup protocol instance. The leader is
responsible for ordering the transactions. Its performances,
i.e., latency and throughput, are periodically observed by
the other instances. If its performance degrades, a different
leader is selected from the backup instance.
Indy maintains a number of ledgers for different pur-
poses, unlike many other blockchain systems which employ
a solo ledger. For example, separate ledgers are maintained
for node maintenance, for identity transactions and so on.
Clients (users via their appropriate software interfaces) can
interact with these ledgers via different nodes for updating
the ledger via transactions and for reading from the ledger
via queries. A fine-grained permission mechanism can be
used to dictate which client has to write permissions, how-
ever, any client can read from the ledger.
Once a node receives a transaction from a client, it per-
forms some validation and then broadcasts the transaction
to other nodes in the network. When the transaction reaches
enough nodes, the primary node starts a new consensus
round using a three-phase commit mechanism. In the end,
all nodes agree to the order proposed by the primary node
and add the transaction into the corresponding ledger.
7.6 Analysis
In this section, we analyse the non-incentive consensus pro-
tocols against the criteria selected before. Block and reward
properties are not considered as they are not relevant for
non-incentivised consensus protocols. We use the notation
‘ ’ to indicate an algorithm satisfies a particular property
and the notation ‘-’ to indicate that there is no informa-
tion regarding that specific property. For other properties,
explanatory texts are added.
STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES. Tn Table 26, we present the
comparison of structural properties among the non-
incentivised consensus algorithms discussed in this section.
As evident from the table, different algorithms use different
types of nodes, and all algorithms are based on single com-
mittee with closed committee type and explicit committee
formation. Only YAC relies on a dynamic configuration
which utilises the reputations of the nodes from previous
interactions; all others have the static configuration.
Voting is the predominantly used underlying mechan-
ism, which is utilised by Tendermint Burrow, YAC, and
RBFT, whereas PoET relies on a lottery mechanism. Fabric
currently utilises the ordering services by the orderer. In
the future, it might utilise SBFT, which leverages the voting
mechanism.
SECURITY PROPERTIES. The comparison of security prop-
erties among the non-incentivised consensus algorithms
is presented in Table 27. All algorithms support non-
repudiation via digital signature and have a significantly
low censorship resistance. This is because the identities of
all participating nodes are known. In case any node starts
misbehaving, because of an attacker taking control of that
node, it can be easily identified, and proper actions can be
taken. The same logic applies for the Sybil protection and
towards DoS resistance. Being mostly based BFT algorithms,
all algorithms, except PoET, have 3f + 1 adversarial tol-
erance. It has been found that PoET has an adversarial
tolerance of Θ
(
log log n
log n
)
[220], where n is the number of
nodes.
PERFORMANCE PROPERTIES. The comparison of perform-
ance properties among the non-incentivised consensus al-
gorithms is presented in Table 28. All algorithms can
provide a good throughput and do not require to consume
any significant amount of energy. PoET, utilising a lottery
mechanism, can be scaled with a large number of valid-
ators, however, this will increase the latency (finality) of
transactions [217]. All other algorithms employing a voting
mechanism cannot be scaled with a large number of val-
idators, providing low latency for the transactions. Fabric,
YAC, and RBFT provide a 2f + 1 fault tolerance, whereas
the information regarding the fault tolerance for PoET and
Tendermint Burrow is not specified formally.
8 DISCUSSION
As per our analysis in different sections, it is clear that PoW
consensus algorithms have major limitations, specifically in
terms of power consumption and scalability. Many regard
PoS, and it is variant DPoS, to be the most suitable altern-
atives. To understand the applications of these algorithms
in public blockchain systems, we have analysed the top 100
crypto-currencies, as reported on CoinMarketCap 4 as of 18
July, 2019.
In the first analysis, we have calculated the number
of consensus algorithms used in these (top 100) crypto-
currencies. The distribution of consensus algorithms is
presented in Figure 15 . As per our analysis, PoW is still
the most widely used (57%) consensus algorithms to date,
whereas DPoS is the second most with 11%, and PoS is the
third most with 6% used consensus algorithms. All other
consensus algorithms represent the remaining 26%. This
means that, even though many consider that PoS and DPoS
are the best alternatives to PoW, their adoption is still far
behind PoW.
To investigate it further, we have analysed a year-
wise distribution of the genesis dates of different crypto-
currencies. It is to understand if there is any inclination
towards an alternative consensus algorithm over PoW in
recent years. The distribution is illustrated in Figure 16,
which represents a surprising observation: PoW is still the
most widely used algorithms for crypto-currencies which
have been created in recent years. For example, the numbers
of crypto-currencies created with PoW algorithms in last
three years (2017, 2018 & 2019) are 11, 19 and 4 respectively,
in comparison to 4, 2 and 2 for PoS and DPoS combinedly.
This implies that PoW is still the most popular consensus
algorithm among the crypto-currency community. A deeper
investigation reveals another insight though. The top 100 list
retrieved from Coinmarketcap also contains crypto-tokens
generated on top of any smart-contract platform such as
Ethereum, EOS and Tron with majority tokens are built on
4. https://coinmarketcap.com/
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Table 26: Comparing structural properties of Consensus Algorithms of Hyperledger Systems.
Single committeeConsensus
/System Mechanism Node type Type Formation Configuration
Fabric Ordering/Voting (SBFT) Client (Regular peer), En-
dorsing peer & Orderer
Close Explicit Static
PoET Lottery Client, Transaction
processor & Validator
Close Explicit Static
Tendermint Burrow Voting As Tendermint (3) Close Explicit Static
YAC Voting Client, Peer & Ordering Ser-
vice node
Close Explicit Dynamic
RBFT Voting Client & Node Close Explicit Static
Table 27: Comparing security properties of Consensus Algorithms of Hyperledger Systems.
Attack VectorsConsensus Non-repudiation Censorship resistance Adversary tolerance Sybil protection DoS Resistance
Fabric Low 3f + 1
PoET Low Θ
(
log log n
log n
)
Tendermint Burrow Low 3f + 1
YAC Low 3f + 1
RBFT Low 3f + 1
Table 28: Comparing performance properties of Consensus Algorithms of Hyperledger Systems.
Consensus Fault tolerance Throughput Scalability Latency Energy
Fabric 2f + 1 Good Medium Low Low
PoET - Good Good Medium Low
Tendermint Burrow - Good Medium Low Low
YAC 2f + 1 Good Medium Low Low
RBFT 2f + 1 Good Medium Low Low
top of Ethereum. Most of these tokens have emerged after
2016 with Ethereum utilising PoW . This could be the reason
why the most recent crypto-currencies have been found to
utilise PoW.
Another indication of PoW domination over other al-
gorithms is the market-cap distribution of their correspond-
ing crypto-currencies. The distribution is presented in Table
29 and illustrated in Figure 17. Not surprisingly, PoW cur-
rencies with a market-cap of around 221 Billion USD have
a massive 93% dominance over other currencies. DPoS and
PoS currencies are the nearest rivals with a market-cap of
around 6 Billion USD and dominance of only 3% for each
group.
Table 29: Market capitalisation of major consensus al-
gorithms in top 100 Crypto-currencies
Consensus Algorithms Market-cap (USD)
PoW 221, 238, 526, 412
DPoS 6, 483, 606, 020
PoS 6, 287, 224, 485
PoW+PoS 2, 436, 683, 929
Proof of Authority 572, 188, 935
Proof of Activity 274, 066, 240
From our investigation, it is clearly evident that PoW
algorithm, even with its major limitations, is still the most
popular consensus algorithm to be utilised in different
crypto-currencies. Currencies which utilise PoW algorithms
consume a significant amount of energy as illustrated in
Section 5.1.4. Besides, they have a reduced throughput (in
terms of transaction number) compared to PoS and DPoS
currencies. For example, the reported TPS (Transactions Per
Second) for Bitcoin and Ethereum are 7 and 15−25, respect-
ively [226], while DPoS currencies EOS has a reported and
estimated TPS of 50 and 4000 respectively [226] and Tron
has a claimed TPS of 2000 [227]. Clearly, DPoS currencies
have better performance, at least in terms of TPS, over
any PoW currency. Therefore, one might ask the underlying
reason behind this counter-intuitive trend of PoW being the
most popular consensus algorithm. We have identified a few
reasons behind this as presented below:
• Bitcoin is the most dominant crypto-currency in terms
of market-cap. As of 18 July, it has a market cap of
around 171 Billion USD. In addition to this, its different
forked variants (Bitcoin Cash 5 and Bitcoin Satoshi
Vision 6) also have a combined market-cap of 8 Billion
USD. If we exclude Bitcoin and its variants, we have
a slightly different distribution of market-cap, as illus-
trated in Figure 18. Here, the market-cap percentage of
PoW algorithm is reduced from 93% to 71% percent,
which is still significant in comparison to DPoS and
PoS, its nearest rivals.
• PoW has the first-mover advantage because of Bit-
coin and Ethereum, both being the pioneer in their
respective domain. Bitcoin has been the first successful
crypto-currency, while Ethereum is the first blockchain-
based smart-contract platform. Other crypto-currencies,
being motivated by their success, might have adopted
the approach of utilising PoW as their corresponding
consensus algorithm.
5. https://www.bitcoincash.org/
6. https://bitcoinsv.io/
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Figure 15: Consensus algorithms in Top 100 Crypto-currencies
• Another strong argument in favour of PoW is its un-
derlying security. The number of miners is far greater
in Bitcoin than the number of validators in PoS and
DPoS. This implies a better decentralisation in Bitcoin
than PoS or DPoS. For example, EOS has only 21 valid-
ators, while Tron has 27 validators. The probability of
collusion among these validators is far greater than that
of any popular PoW currency. For this reason, many in
the blockchain community have been doubtful of the
security of any PoS/DPoS currency. However, there is
a counter argument against this. Because of the mining
centralisation issue ( highlighted in Section 5.1.4), many
point out that a PoW algorithm might also be prone
to centralisation. Therefore, a PoW currency might also
suffer from collusion attack.
With the dominance of PoW over other consensus al-
gorithms, one might wonder what lies ahead and might ask
if there will be any shift of balance among the consensus
algorithms. We believe that we will most definitely experi-
ment with a shifting of balance in the near future. In this
regard, the PoS transformation process of Ethereum will
be a crucial factor. The proposed Ethereum PoS consensus
mechanisms, both CFFG and CTFG, are highly regarded
by the academics and industrial enthusiasts for their strong
guarantee of security. With their strong focus on economic
incentive and game-theoretic based approach, it is believed
that their security will be as close as PoW and much better
than any current PoS/DPoS algorithm can provide. In par-
ticular, the number of validators will be much higher than
any number leveraged in the current PoS/DPoS algorithms.
However, it is yet to be seen how they will perform once
deployed in real-life settings.
The existence of numerous algorithms and wide vari-
ations in their properties impose a major challenge to com-
prehend them properly. In particular, it is often difficult to
test the suitability of a particular algorithm under certain
criteria. A visual tool would be a great help in this regard.
Towards this aim, we present a decision tree in Figure 19,
which can be used to determine the suitable consensus
algorithms under certain criteria in different scenarios. For
example, such a decision tree diagram can be leveraged
to select a particular consensus algorithm while design-
ing/developing a new blockchain system.
The tree utilises five critical criteria to achieve its goal:
incentives, energy consumption, scalability, security (with
respect to adversary tolerance), and ASIC-resistance. If the
system needs to incentivise the miner/validating nodes,
then proof-of-work(PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) con-
sensus are appropriate choices. Because of their underlying
incentives mechanisms, the primary applications of these
consensus algorithms are public crypto-currencies. On the
other hand, a private blockchain network usually does not
rely on any crypto-currencies to motivate or incentivise
any validators to run the blockchain network. In addition
to incentives, energy consumption is another determining
factor in choosing appropriate consensus algorithms. PoW-
type algorithms consume high energy, whereas PoS al-
gorithms and their derivatives consume a moderate amount
of energy. PoW-types algorithms are very slow as of now
and can process only a limited number of transactions.
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Figure 17: Percentage of market capitalisation of consensus algorithms in top 100 Crypto-currencies
However, compromising a popular PoW-based blockchain
network is very difficult, and therefore, they are more secure
than their counterparts. PoW-based algorithms can also be
classified based on computational complexity. As discussed
earlier, ASIC is a specialised hardware, designed and used
to solve hash-based computational problems. ASIC is ex-
pensive and hinders common people from participating
in the blockchain network. Therefore, memory-based PoW
has been designed. Now it is widely used in different
crypto-currencies. Non-incentivised consensus algorithms
are mostly used in private blockchain systems. They con-
sume a very low amount of energy compared to other types
of consensus algorithms and are also very scalable. That
means the miners can verify the transactions and create
blocks really fast. However, a comparatively low number of
validating nodes makes these algorithms more vulnerable
to attacks.
For clarity, we provide a few examples to utilise the
decision tree diagram presented in Figure 19. If an incentiv-
ised algorithm is required for a highly scalable blockchain
system that aims to consume low energy DPoS and BFT
derivatives such as Tendermint, CTFG, and Ouroboros are
the preferred options. However, they will have moderate
security as described earlier. On the other hand, if security
is of the highest priority, PoW algorithms are more suitable.
In this scenario, there are two options: memory-bound or
CPU bound. If ASIC resistance is desired, one should opt
for memory-bound PoW algorithms. However, in such a
case, one has to sacrifice scalability, and such algorithms
will consume high energy.
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Note that this is just an example of how such a diagram
can be developed using our selected four criteria. Other
criteria can be utilised to generate a different diagram which
might be suitable for other specific scenarios. Whenever
such a diagram is to be developed, the tables (Table 13, Table
14, Table 15, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20, Table 21,
Table 22, Table 23, Table 24, Table 26, Table 27 and Table 28)
utilised to compare different consensus algorithms against
the defined properties in the taxonomy will be crucial as
the these tables will provide the required template by which
such a diagram can be created.
9 CONCLUSION
With the popularisation of crypto-currencies, and block-
chain in general, there has been a renewed interest in the
practical implications of different distributed consensus al-
gorithms. Most of the existing systems struggle to properly
satisfy the need for any wide-scale real-life deployment as
they have serious limitations. Many of these limitations are
due to the underlying consensus algorithm used in a partic-
ular system. Therefore, in the quest to create more suitable
practical blockchain systems, the principal focus has been
on distributed consensus. This has led to the explorations;
either existing consensus algorithms have been exploited
or novel consensus mechanisms have been introduced. The
ultimate consequence of this phenomenon is a wide-range
of consensus algorithms currently in existence. To advance
the knowledge of this domain, it is essential to synthesise
these consensus algorithms under a systematic study, which
is the main motivation of this article.
Even though there have been several similar works, this
is the first paper to introduce a taxonomy of properties
desirable for a consensus algorithm and then utilise that
taxonomy to analyse each algorithm in a detailed fash-
ion. In addition, different consensus algorithms have been
grouped into two major categories: Incentivised and Non-
incentivised consensus algorithms. An incentivised con-
sensus algorithm, exclusively utilised by public blockchain
systems and crypto-currencies, relies on incentives for the
participants in order to motivate them to behave as inten-
ded. On the other hand, in any non-incentivised algorithm,
the participants are considered as trusted, and hence, it is
assumed that no incentives are required to ensure intended
behaviour. As such, these algorithms are mostly used in the
private blockchain sphere. We have again grouped incentiv-
ised algorithms into three major sub-categories: PoW (Proof
of Work), Proof of Stake (PoS) and consensus algorithms
beyond PoW and PoS.
A PoW algorithm relies on computational complexit-
ies or memory size/performance to solve a cryptographic
puzzle. There are three major approaches followed by PoW
consensus algorithms: i) a compute-bound PoW leveraging
the capabilities of the processing unit, ii) a memory-bound
PoW which is more reliant on the size and performance of
the main memory, and iii) a chained PoW utilises a num-
ber of hashing algorithms executed consecutively one after
another. Blockchain systems utilising such a mechanism has
special nodes, called miner nodes, who are responsible for
solving this puzzle and creating a new and valid block
and extending the chain by appending this block in the
existing chain. The probability to solve this puzzle depends
on a network parameter, called difficulty, which is adjusted
automatically after a certain period of time. As more miners
participate in the network, the network parameters are
adjusted in such a manner that requires more computa-
tional power to mine a new block. As the corresponding
systems become more popular, it attracts more miners,
which increases the security of the system. However, the
increased computational power results in more energy being
consumed. Apart from this, PoW systems generally have a
low throughput and do not scale properly. PoS algorithms
and their corresponding mechanisms have been analysed in
greater detail in Section 5.1.
To alleviate the major issues of PoW, Proof of Stake (PoS)
has been proposed. In PoS, the nodes who would like to
participate in the block creating process are called minters,
and they need to own and lock a certain amount of the
corresponding crypto-currency, called stake. Such a stake is
used to ensure that the minters will act as required since
they will lose their stakes when acting maliciously. PoS has
several variants: Chained PoS, BFT PoS and DPoS. The core
idea of a chained PoS is to leverage a combination of PoW
and PoS algorithms chained together to achieve consensus.
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BFT PoS uses a multi-round PoS mechanism in which a
validator (minter) is selected, from a set of validators, by
the agreement of super-majority quorum among other val-
idators. On the other hand, DPoS selects a minter, from a
set of minters, using votes from other clients of the network.
PoS algorithms are generally fast and scalable, having high
throughput. However, they also need to consider several
other attack vectors such as Nothing-at-stake, bribing, long-
range attack, cartel formation, and so on. Detailed analysis
of different aspects of PoS algorithms has been presented in
Section 5.2.
There are also some Hybrid consensus algorithms that
combine the mechanisms of PoW and/pr PoS with another
novel algorithm. Proof of Research, Proof of Burn, Proof of
Stake-Velocity are examples of such an algorithm. Again,
there are mechanisms that are novel and have no reliance
on PoW/PoS whatsoever. Proof of Cooperation and Proof
of Importance are examples of such novel algorithms. The
discussion and analysis of these consensus algorithms have
been presented in Section 6.
Finally, there are also a few non-incentivised consensus
algorithms which are exclusively utilised in private block-
chain systems. Hyperledger is the leading private block-
chain foundation under which different private blockchain
systems such as Hyperledger Fabric, Hyperledger Sawtooth,
Hyperledger Burrow, Hyperledger Iroha, Hyperledger Indy,
and so on. These systems rely on different other consensus
mechanisms such as SBFT, PoET, Tendermint Burrow, YAC,
and RBFT. Key characteristics of these consensus algorithms
are high throughput and low latency with acceptable scalab-
ility. Also, the algorithms require that every entity that
participates in the network must be properly authenticated.
A detailed analysis of these algorithms has been presented
in Section 7.
Our analysis in Section 8 suggests that PoW, with its
many disadvantages, still is the most dominant in terms of
market capitalisation (indicating its adoption) and crypto-
currency in the world. As discussed earlier, DPoS and PoS
algorithms, PoW’s closest rivals, aim to tackle many of
PoW’s limitations. However, their adoption is still limited.
In addition to this analysis, we have presented an exemplary
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decision tree-based figure which can be utilised to filter out
or select consensus algorithms that fit certain criteria. Such
a figure will be a useful tool for any who would like to test
the suitability of a certain consensus algorithm under certain
criteria.
There is one issue that must be highlighted before we
conclude this article. The principal focus of this article has
been to explore and synthesise the consensus algorithms
available in different blockchain systems. However, there
are other distributed ledger systems, which do not rely on
any blockchain-type structure. Instead, they utilise other
structures to represent their respective ledgers. Examples
of two such prominent crypto-currencies are IoTA 7 and
NANO 8. Both of their ledgers are based on DAG (Directed
Acyclic Graph), a specific type of directed graph with no
cycle. However, IoTA uses a novel consensus algorithm
called Tangle [229] while NANO utilises a representative
based consensus mechanism [228]. These two systems have
received significant attention because of their fee-less struc-
ture and fast transaction rates. However, we do not consider
these systems any further as they are out of scope for this
article. We plan to investigate such novel systems in the
future in a different exploration.
There is high anticipation among the blockchain enthu-
siasts that blockchain technology will disrupt many existing
application domains. However, to unlock its true potential, a
blockchain system must adopt a suitable consensus that can
enable it to satisfy its intended properties. This is because
a consensus algorithm is the core component of any block-
chain system, and it dictates how a system behaves and the
performance it can achieve. However, as our analysis in this
article suggests, an ideal consensus algorithm is still elusive
as almost all algorithms have significant disadvantages in
one way or another with respect to their security and
performance. Until a consensus algorithm finds the correct
balance between these crucial factors, we might not see the
wide-scale adoption as many crypto-currency enthusiasts
are hoping.
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